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INTRODUCTION
1

Even before Justice John Paul Stevens wrote his so-called Lackey memo
prisoners on death row were asserting that the lengthy delays—many times
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2

decades-long —before their executions made their punishments
3
constitutionally infirm. As Justice Stevens and plaintiffs presented the
claim, it embodied two discrete points. First, the mere fact of delay, usually
accompanied by horrible prison conditions including solitary confinement,
was itself “cruel and unusual.” Prisoners were made to wait indefinite
periods of time before they were killed, sometimes due to the fault of the
state, sometimes due to their own appeals, but in any case, the possibility of
their execution kept on being put off. This wait, said some, was akin to

1
2

3

Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial of
certiorari).
See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 41, 42 (2012) [hereinafter Newton, Slow Wheels] (noting that based on DOJ
statistics the “average condemned inmate in 2010 . . . spent nearly fifteen years under a
sentence of death before being executed,” but concluding that “the actual average likely
is closer to twenty years”); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On
Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1995) (“Putting aside the relatively few cases in
which a death row inmate simply gives up, a case that comes to its conclusion within seven
years of the crime is relatively rare. Ten years is about average, and cases like that of
Duncan Peder McKenzie, whose case took over two decades to shuttle its way repeatedly
between the state and federal courts, are not that atypical.”); see also Brent E. Newton,
Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF.
L. REV. 979, 991 (2014) (indicating that the last ten people executed by Florida spent an
“average of 24.9 years on death row” (quoting Justice Kennedy)); Megan Elizabeth
Tongue, Note, Omnes Vulnerant, Postuma Necat; All the Hours Wound, the Last One Kills:
The Lengthy Stay on Death Row in America, 80 MO. L. REV. 897, 897 (2015) (explaining that
the “amount of time an inmate spends on death row has almost tripled over the past few
decades”) (citations omitted); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1062 (C.D. Cal.
2014), appeal dismissed (Dec. 1, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir.
2015) (“[In California,] [t]he review process takes an average of 25 years, and the delay is
only getting longer.”).
One of the earliest versions of a Lackey claim seems to be Chessman v. Dixon, in the Ninth
Circuit. See Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960) (addressing
petitioner’s assertion that being confined for eleven and one-half years on death row
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment); see also Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (Stevens, J.,
memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari) (recognizing that the Supreme Court
should consider the importance and novelty of a death row prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment challenge to delayed execution after other courts have addressed this issue);
Sireci v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067, 1067–68 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay)
(recognizing as cruel and unusual the execution of a person on death row after decades
of incarceration); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
statement respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (expressing that
executing incarcerated persons after delays is “unacceptably cruel”); Smith v. Arizona,
552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (explaining
that he would have granted the petition for certiorari because executing a prisoner more
than thirty years after his conviction would be cruel and unusual); Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (expressing that
the prisoner’s twenty-seven years awaiting execution could be considered cruel and
unusual punishment).
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4

torture. The second argument was different. It said that the fact of delay,
while perhaps bad in itself, removed the original penological justifications
5
for their punishment. The extended delay vitiated any deterrent potential
of the punishment; and delay made it no longer the case that their
6
punishments were in any sense “retributive.” The outrage that prompted
the demand for the prisoners’ death might have faded (or been otherwise
7
sated); the prisoners, too, could be said to be different people, no longer
8
deserving of death as they once might have been.
9
Lackey arguments have overwhelmingly failed, but not for want of trying.
One plaintiff came close in Jones v. Chappell when he won at the district court
10
11
level, but his case was reversed on appeal on procedural grounds. What I

4

5

6

7
8
9
10

11

See, e.g., Valle, 564 U.S. at 1067–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (considering
the execution of an incarcerated person who has been on death row for decades to be
cruel and unusual).
See, e.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1115 (Stevens, J., statement respecting the denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari) (“[D]elaying an execution does not further public
purposes of retribution and deterrence but only diminishes whatever possible benefit
society might receive from petitioner’s death.”).
See Valle, 564 U.S. at 1068 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (“The commonly
accepted justifications for the death penalty are close to nonexistent in a case such as this
one. It is difficult to imagine how an execution following so long a period of
incarceration could add significantly to that punishment’s deterrent value.”).
Id. (“And, I would ask how often that community’s sense of retribution would forcefully
insist upon a death that comes only several decades after the crime was committed.”).
See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2769 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The offender
may have found himself a changed human being.”).
See, e.g., State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2007), decision clarified on reh’g, 875
N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 2007) (“It appears that no Lackey claim has been successful.”).
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Inordinate and
unpredictable delay has resulted in a death penalty system in which very few of the
hundreds of individuals sentenced to death have been, or even will be, executed by the
State. It has resulted in a system in which arbitrary factors, rather than legitimate ones
like the nature of the crime or the date of the death sentence, determine whether an
individual will actually be executed. And it has resulted in a system that serves no
penological purpose. Such a system is unconstitutional.”). The district court judge in
Jones also made an independent argument that the imposition in any one case was
“arbitrary.” Id. at 1053. (“Indeed, for most, systemic delay has made their execution so
unlikely that the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been
quietly transformed into one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in
prison, with the remote possibility of death. As for the random few for whom execution does
become a reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their execution
will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be arbitrary.”). I do not deal with
that argument at any length here.
See Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 553 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing judgment in favor of
prisoner based on the recognition that “the purpose of federal habeas corpus is to ensure
that state convictions comply with the federal law in existence at the time the conviction
became final, and not to provide a mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final
judgments based upon later emerging legal doctrine” (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S.
227, 234 (1990))).
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want to suggest in this Article is that Lackey arguments may be insufficiently
12
Many scholars and two Justices have asserted, especially in the
radical.
second variant of the Lackey claim, that delay undermines the arguments for
the death penalty because a late execution no longer deters or satisfies
retribution. However this might be true of deterrence—and I largely leave
13
deterrence to the side in this Article —it is not obvious that a delay in
execution means that a punishment is no longer retributively just. It
depends on what retribution is. And here both advocates of the Lackey
argument as well as the Supreme Court have been less than clear as to which
version of retribution they are endorsing. This matters, because on some
versions of retribution, the Lackey argument works; but on others, it falls
14
flat. The first contribution of my Article is to clarify the various meanings
of retribution and to run the Lackey argument through them. It seems
surprising that such a fundamental part of the Lackey claim should have
gone unexamined for so long. Over the years the Supreme Court has
15
presented very different versions of retribution, and whether delay
undermines “retribution” critically depends on which version we adopt.
But this conceptual clarification leads me to the second and more
fundamental contribution of my Article. It turns out that the version of
retribution under which Lackey succeeds is not very persuasive, but that the
version of retribution under which the Lackey claims do have merit has a
strange and problematic implication—so strange, in fact, that we should be
led to wonder whether a retributive theory of this kind can be a permissible
16
purpose for governments to pursue.
Briefly, my argument is this. If retribution is understood as simply
expressing community outrage and the need to satisfy that outrage, then the
Lackey claim seems to succeed. It is plausible that community outrage may
17
fade over time, and so we may actually—after ten, twenty, thirty years —no
longer be as outraged as we once were: accordingly, the claim that we need
death to satisfy that outrage doesn’t have the same bite. If the purpose of
killing someone was for this purpose, the purpose is arguably no longer
served when people no longer care, or are indifferent about the execution

12
13

14
15
16
17

See infra Part III.
The Court has routinely stated that the main reason for imposing the death penalty is not
deterrence, but retribution. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984)
(claiming retribution is the “primary justification for the death penalty”).
See infra Part II.
Id.
See infra Part III.
See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (pointing to Appendix
A of the district court record, which indicates that there are currently dozens of inmates
who have been on California’s death row for as long as thirty to thirty-five years).
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(or whatever outrage they had is satisfied by the long term in prison on
death row).
But this “community outrage” version of retribution is not all that
appealing. It smacks of revenge, for one. Even bracketing that, it is not
18
even a satisfying view of retribution. It leaves too much in the hands of
fickle community sentiment. What if a community values some lives too
cheaply, so that when they ought to be outraged, they are not? Nor is it
obvious as an empirical matter that community outrage will fade over time—
19
couldn’t we stoke it back up again as the execution date nears? So this
version of retribution has problems. If it were the only version of retribution
we had to offer, then the Lackey claim might succeed, although even then it
might be an empirical question as to whether members of the community
would still be angry after decades of waiting. If they were, the claim would
fail.
There is a better and more persuasive version of retribution out there.
As opposed to the community sentiment version, this version says that some
people who have done terrible crimes ought to die as a matter of justice. If a
community does not feel that these people ought to die, then it is wrong—
they should feel that way. And if a person is not sentenced to death then we
collectively have made a mistake, a mistake that threatens justice being done
on this earth. Immanuel Kant advocated for this kind of retributivism, so it
20
has a philosophically respectable lineage. In some instances, retribution
may demand death, no matter what the community feels. If this is the
version of retribution we accept, then it is not obvious that the retributive
purpose of punishment is undermined by delay. So long as the person is
executed, a delay in the date of that execution may be unfortunate, but it

18

19

20

In my criticism below, I also leave out an obvious concern: who is the relevant
community? I assume it includes at least those immediately affected by the crime in
question, most especially the victim.
See, e.g., Bob Ross, Old Wounds Reopen for River Ridge Parents as Daughter’s Killer Resentenced,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/03/twelve_
years_after_daughters_k.html (reflecting the intense emotions that can resurrect in
victims as their perpetrator’s execution date approaches).
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 140 (John. Ladd trans., Hackett Publishing 2d. 1999) (“Even if a civil society
were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members (for example, if the
people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves around the
world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone
will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be
fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if
they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal
justice.”). See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 509 (1987) (exploring “Kant’s writings on crime and punishment”
and considering “Kant as a paradigm retributivist in the theory of punishment”).
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does not remove the point of executing the person: it was to give that person
21
their “just deserts.”
In one large set of cases, however, delay would hurt the satisfaction of
this sort of intrinsic justice retribution. If delay means that the death row
22
inmate in prison dies before being executed, then he will have cheated his
just punishment. In other words, if retribution demands execution by the state,
it is not enough that the person have died in prison, anymore than if the
prisoner had been hit by a truck before being captured. We are all going to
die eventually, after all—we are all in this sense “sentenced to death.” But
the unique thing about the person who deserves to die is that he deserves to
die in a certain way: at the hands of the state—that is, at the hands of us.
So there is a version of (intrinsic justice) retribution in which the Lackey
claim would in theory succeed, albeit in a way that would help no inmate
who is still alive. But noting that retribution might demand the execution of
someone at death’s door may lead us to reflect on retribution as a purpose
in the first place. Retribution may be, in some guises, a philosophically
attractive theory. But for all that, is it an acceptable purpose for the state to
have? This is an under-examined part of death penalty writing and
punishment jurisprudence more generally. There is plenty of talk about
whether the death penalty is a deterrent or whether it satisfies retribution.
But what makes these purposes appropriate, and by what standard should we
23
assess them?
The Supreme Court at various times has written that
24
retribution was going out of fashion as a theory of punishment; it also
25
expressed the possibility of some purposes (e.g., eugenics ) that we would
never countenance as acceptable today. They would be beyond the pale. It
is thus something we should consider that some purposes of punishment, when
we understand them aright, are simply not acceptable purposes for the state
to pursue.
I think that this is what we could say about the intrinsic justice variety of
retribution—the kind of retribution that is robust enough to resist most
Lackey claims. The argument here is speculative, and points to the need for
21
22
23

24

25

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (defining retribution as “the interest in
seeing the offender gets his ‘just deserts’”).
This, in fact, is what happens in a large percentage of cases. See infra Part II.C.
See Michele Cotton, Back with A Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14, 1361–62 (2000)
(examining the various purposes for state punishment).
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248–49 (1949) (holding reformation and
rehabilitation—especially in the form of modern probation practices aimed at restoring
offenders to “useful citizenship”—have become “important goals of punishment” and
“[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law”).
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous
Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 655–61 (2010) (discussing the history of
eugenics as an argument for capital punishment).
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more thinking in this area, but I base it on two claims. First, the intrinsic
retribution theory could represent an impermissible endorsement by the
state of a sort of quasi-religious view. It is recognized that the state cannot
establish a particular religious view over others, and the intrinsic version of
retribution may represent nothing more than a religious view on the nature
of responsibility, and the need to exact justice in this world (rather than the
next). Ronald Dworkin has made a similar claim in relation to the abortion
27
debate, and I try to transplant his argument into this new context.
But the intrinsic retribution argument can also be seen as—and has been
seen as by members of the Court—a kind of personal vendetta, a kind of
28
revenge. It is also, we might think, impermissible for the state to base its
29
purposes on passion, or hatred. And this, too, is what intrinsic retribution
can look like. Consider the implications if a person is on his deathbed,
moments away from dying, and his appeals have been exhausted. Intrinsic
retribution says that we still need to execute this person in order for justice to be
served. If this is not some high-minded belief in settling moral scores in this
world, it does look to be a lot like vengeance and perhaps it is here that
intrinsic retribution seems to sort of bottom out in community outrage. It is
not enough, after all, that the prisoner dies; it must be at our hands. We get
to choose the time of his dying—he can’t go on his terms. This need to kill
either looks like some religious compulsion gone wrong or is really a
sophisticated kind of vendetta, motivated by animus, against the death row
inmate. Or so I want to suggest.
My Article has three parts. In Part I, I look at the history of Lackey claims,
and try to pare down the essence of those claims. In this, I am helped by
situating my argument in this Article against some recent claims made by
Russell Christopher, one of the most philosophically sophisticated scholars
30
to examine Lackey claims in depth. Christopher’s work helps me to strip
away a fallacious rebuttal made to Lackey claims and to focus on the novel
parts of my argument. In Part II, I spell out the two versions of retribution
26
27

28

29

30

See infra Part III.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 102–17 (1993) (Developing the argument that controversies
about abortion deal with contested philosophical and theological issues, about which the
state properly does not take sides).
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) (equating “forcing
retribution from the offender” with “naked vengeance” in a case considering exile as
punishment for desertion during time of war).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a similar sensibility is behind
the Court’s rule that animus or hostility to a vulnerable group cannot be a legitimate state
interest that justifies discrimination).
See Russel L. Christopher, Death Delayed is Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 421, 421–23,
483 (2014) (explaining how the combination of capital punishment and a substantial
death row incarceration is unconstitutional under Lackey).
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with which the Court may be operating in considering Lackey claims. Part of
this is expository, and historical. It is striking that the Court should be
inconsistent in what it means by retribution, given how boilerplate its
invocations of that purpose have become in its recent opinions. I also, in
Part II, appeal in passing to several important recent papers that look at the
31
important role time plays in our understanding of punishment. I show how
Lackey claims can work if we adopt a version of retribution that is time
sensitive, but how they fail if we choose to side with a time-insensitive
version. This leads me to the third and final part of my Article, where I
question whether the state can pursue a time-insensitive version of
retribution as an appropriate state purpose. I argue that it can’t, which
leads me to my overall conclusion: either Lackey claims work under an
unattractive and weak theory of retributive punishment, or they don’t work;
but the theory under which they don’t work makes (or should make)
retribution off-limits as an appropriate purpose of state punishment.

I. DISSECTING THE LACKEY MEMO
The canonical statement of a Lackey claim is by Justice Stevens, written as
32
a dissent to a denial of certiorari in Clarence Lackey’s case. It was more of
an invitation than an argument, but it has since been elaborated on by
33
another member of the Court (Justice Stephen Breyer ), disputed on the
34
Court by another Justice (Justice Clarence Thomas ), and launched a score
of attempts by death row inmates. I here want to lay the foundation of the

31
32

33

34

See infra Part II.
See generally Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting
the denial of certiorari). In Lackey, Justice Stevens recognized that “[t]he deterrent value
of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be comparable to the
consequences of the ultimate step itself” and that the “sanction imposed cannot be so
totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering.” Id. (quoting Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
See Sireci v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067, 1067–68 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay)
(recognizing as cruel and unusual the execution of a person on death row after decades
of incarceration); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (explaining that he would have granted the petition for
certiorari because executing a prisoner more than thirty years after his conviction would
be cruel and unusual); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (expressing that prisoner’s twenty-seven years awaiting
execution could be considered cruel and unusual punishment).
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (mem.) (Thomas, J. concurring in denial of
certiorari) (“Five years ago, Justice STEVENS issued an invitation to state and lower
courts to serve as ‘laboratories’ in which the viability of this claim could receive further
study. These courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless.”) (citation to
Lackey memo omitted).
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Lackey argument, show its variations, and try to strip out several debates that
it has spawned which seem to me to either focus on irrelevant issues, or to
be not the strongest part of the Lackey argument. It is no secret that many of
35
those who side with Lackey oppose the death penalty root-and-branch. But
it is important, I think, for the general success of Lackey claims that they be
presented as different than arguments that say that the death penalty itself is
36
cruel and unusual (even though it may be). Presenting Lackey claims as
independent arguments increases their appeal to those who may otherwise
believe the death penalty is just (which includes, apparently, a majority of
37
the current Court ). It also, as a matter of analytical clarity, separates Lackey
claims from general arguments that putting someone to death is unjust.
When Justice Stevens wrote his memo, it was, I think, in this spirit: that
plaintiffs have something in addition to argue, instead of only a general
opposition to the death penalty and any other procedural claims they may
have.
38

A. The Two Lackey Claims

As presented over the years by Justices Breyer and Stevens, the so-called
Lackey claim actually comprises two discrete claims, although both press the
problem with delaying imposition of the death penalty for an extended
39
period of time. The first kind of Lackey claim—and the one, I will say up
front, that I am less interested in—deals with the punishment inherent in
the delay itself. Waiting to be executed, or rather, waiting a long time to be
executed exacts a terrible physical and psychological toll on the prisoner, to
the point where just waiting is enough for his punishment to be “cruel and
40
unusual.” On this version of the Lackey claim, there is something in the

35

36

37
38

39
40

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, called for revisiting the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself the previous summer. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.
Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Christopher, supra note 30, at 484
(“Capital punishment proponents might even have the most to gain [if the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and decided a Lackey claim].”).
Christopher, supra note 30, at 426–27 (clarifying that the Lackey claim is that execution
following decades-long incarceration is cruel and unusual and not the claim that any
execution is cruel and unusual).
This may change, depending on who replaces Justice Antonin Scalia on the Court.
For a good summary of these two claims that I follow, see Judge William A. Fletcher’s
dissent in Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998). I also entertain a third type
of Lackey claim, below. See infra Part I.C.
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial of
certiorari).
See Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067, 1068 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay)
(“I have little doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of incarceration under sentence
of death.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“[T]he prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long

440

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

delay itself that makes it an impermissible punishment (what this is,
precisely, is something I will get to shortly). The second kind of Lackey
claim, however, deals with the purpose of executing someone after a long
delay, and not merely with the delay itself. After a long delay, this second
argument goes, there really may be no point in executing the person. The
deterrent value of such an execution will be minor after such a long delay, if
not non-existent—at the very least, the deterrent value will have already
been realized in the long prison stay, so no additional deterrent value will be
gotten by the execution. So too will the retribution exacted be either
already realized (he will have suffered a long delay already, and certainly this
can count as “retribution” for his crime) or too little (people will no longer
have the same outrage they did when the person committed his crime, so his
41
death will mean little to them and so is not required by retribution). On
this second Lackey claim, the problem is the execution happening after the
delay, not merely the horror inherent in the delay itself. Again, I am more
interested in the second kind of Lackey claim.
42
But I should say some things about the first type of Lackey claim. As
even its proponents note, there is some ambiguity in the content of the
claim, especially when we put it at a high level of generality. Two points are
worth mentioning here about the ambiguities in the first Lackey claim. First,
how much delay is too much, or enough to give rise to the anxiety and the
worry of a pending execution? How long does the delay have to be to make
43
it too long? The answer to that seems to me unclear. One might imagine
that even learning that one’s execution is a month away, or a week away,
44
would inspire anxiety about the precise date and time that one would die.
The so-called “death row” phenomenon can even be said to be inherent in

41
42
43

44

wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death.”); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(imprisonment under threat of imminent execution is “horrible” and “dehumanizing”);
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (noting “dehumanizing effects of the
lengthy imprisonment prior to execution” which are “often so degrading and brutalizing
to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture”). For a meditation on the
topic, see ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND
DEATH 173 (Justin O’Brien trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1961).
Christopher, supra note 30, at 431–32.
Later in this section, I discuss another possible interpretation of this kind of Lackey claim,
which I think should be separated and considered as a possible “third” Lackey argument.
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (“[T]he combination of uncertainty in the execution and long delay is
arguably cruel.”).
See, e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (“[W]hen a prisoner sentenced by a court
to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of
the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the
uncertainty during the whole of it . . . .”). Note how the mere fact of being sentenced to
die at some point in the future gives rise to some uncertainty as to when exactly that will be.
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45

the very act of having a death penalty. Of course, one might say that if a
delay of a month is bad, a fortiori a delay of ten or more years is even worse
and more psychologically damaging than that one month (it may differ
depending on the psychological stability of the inmates; the anxiety may be
46
greater or lesser depending on the person). But it is hard to draw a firm
line here—one that clearly puts punishment that is cruel and unusual on
one side of the line, and a permissible punishment on the other side. And
indeed, it is most plausible to say that this anxiety is always present. That is
why the first Lackey claim, to my mind, comes very close to simply being an
objection to the death penalty: a penalty which causes this kind of suffering,
47
this kind of anxiety, is per se cruel and unusual, thus making the death
penalty never okay. And of course there will always be some delays
48
49
(necessarily) in an execution (a point I will return to later ).
But this gets us to a second ambiguity about the Lackey claim. It may not
be merely the fact of delay, and uncertainty, that makes the delay
50
intolerable, but the conditions in which the person is confined. And it is
true that conditions on death row are horrible on top of the fact that one is

45

46

47

48

49
50

Such a conclusion seems to be made by Brent E. Newton when he says in a footnote that
“such [awful] conditions are inherently part of the death penalty.” Newton, Slow Wheels,
supra note 2, at 55 n.62. For a discussion of the death row phenomenon in connection
with a Lackey claim, see, e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1487 (Norris, J., dissenting)
(discussing the “death row phenomenon” or “the protracted incarceration of condemned
prisoners under a sentence of death in extreme conditions of confinement”). See also
Tongue, supra note 2, at 901–02 (describing “death row syndrome,” with citations). The
locus classicus of a court finding the death penalty impermissible by reference to the
conditions on death row alone is Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 478
(1989) (holding that while international law does not prohibit the death penalty, the risk
of “death row phenomenon” would violate the Convention’s Article 3 prohibition on
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment).
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the
denial of certiorari) (noting that if the effect of uncertainty is terrible in a delay of four
weeks, delays that “last for many years” will be even worse).
Consider, in this regard, the discussion in a footnote in Dist. Atty. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d
1274, 1291 n.5 (Mass. 1980), which ponders whether even one night on death row is too
much. Id. (“My argument that the ordeal imposed on the condemned is cruel and
unusual punishment does not depend on the existence of lengthy delays between
sentence and execution.”).
See State v. Azania, 875 N.E.2d 994, 998–99 (listing among delays to a speedy trial: “delay
between the commission of the crime and indictment; delay between indictment and
arrest; delay between arrest and trial; delay between trial and sentencing; delay in
processing appeal; delay between appellate court decision and subsequent retrial; and
delay between appellate court decision and subsequent resentencing proceeding”),
decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 701, 702–03 (Ind. 2007).
See infra Part I.C.
See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 115 (2009) (describing “severe conditions
of confinement” including “spending 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 9-foot cell”
and concluding that the “dehumanizing effects of such treatment are undeniable”).
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waiting—with considerable uncertainty—for one’s death. But this strikes
me as a point that can be addressed on its own, perhaps separated from the
delay. It seems, in other words, that we could conceptualize awful prison
conditions on their own as being in possible violation of the Eighth
Amendment—if one is in solitary confinement for the duration of one’s life
(and one knows this) this may amount to cruel and unusual punishment,
52
even when one is not sentenced to be executed by the state. This seems to
me not too different than a person on death row who experiences the same
conditions. It is not that his experience may be worse because of the delay;
certainly it may be. But there is no reason to think that the conditions by
themselves might be bad enough to rise to the level of being cruel and
unusual. It does not seem to me that it is necessary that there be delay and
bad conditions to have an Eighth Amendment violation, that there is some
alchemy that makes delay plus bad conditions to be only sufficient for being
cruel and unusual. Whereas my first point suggested that delay on its own
might be enough to be cruel and unusual, here I suggest something
different, but still something that I think diminishes the uniqueness of the
first variant of the Lackey claim: conditions in many prisons may be awful by
themselves for any prisoner, not just those waiting on death row. We should
prise this objection apart from the Lackey claim.
So as a result, I find the second type of Lackey claim the more interesting,
viz., the idea that delay undermines the purposes involved in punishing
someone. Such an argument could, at least in principle, appeal to those
who support the death penalty and who feel it serves some useful purposes.
If the first Lackey claim can appear to condemn any delay in waiting for the
death penalty or to focus on something not unique to the death penalty
(bad prison conditions), the second type of Lackey claim says: there is a time
at which the delay in imposition of the death penalty makes the death
53
penalty pointless, and so possibly cruel and unusual. This claim is careful
51
52

53

See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing a Lackey claim
based on “long tenure on death row under ‘horrific conditions’”); id. at 950.
See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he
judiciary may be required . . . to determine whether workable alternative systems for longterm confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to
adopt them.”), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 (2015); see also George Lombardi, Richard D.
Sluder & Donald Wallace, The Management of Death-Sentenced Inmates: Issues,
Realities, and Innovative Strategies (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript),
https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/DeathSentencedInmates.pdf (reviewing several court
decisions addressing whether death row conditions violated the Eighth Amendment).
This broader claim—about the pointlessness of an execution making it cruel and unusual
is present in Justice White’s concurrence in Furman:
At the moment that [an execution] ceases realistically to further [the] purposes
[of punishment], the emerging question is whether its imposition in such
circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would,
for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with
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not to say that the death penalty always is unjustified; that is, to maintain that
any delay will moot the purposes for which death is imposed. It only says
that there is a certain point where the delay becomes “too long” that death
may no longer be warranted. Certainly there is an ambiguity here, but
unlike the first type of Lackey claim, it is not an ambiguity which seems to cut
against imposing the death penalty at all.
In fact, the proponent of the second type of Lackey claim could be a
death penalty supporter and lament the fact that there are too many delays
in administering the death penalty, to the point where the death penalty
loses its bite. Chief Justice William Rehnquist in fact wrote just such an
opinion. In Coleman v. Balkcom, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that
because the Court had introduced so many procedural obstacles to the
death penalty, it had made it “virtually impossible for States to enforce with
reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment
statutes,” which “lessen[ed] the deterrent effect of the threat of capital
punishment” and “undermine[d] the integrity of the entire criminal justice
54
system.”
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., expressed a similar concern in an
55
article written after he had stepped off the bench.
I think it is fairly plausible to believe that the longer the delay in
executing someone, the less deterrent value the mere fact of execution has.
It is axiomatic in deterrent theory that the key things in making a
punishment have a high deterrent value are that the punishment be swift
56
and certain. Delay undermines both of these things. Pushing an execution
back further and further separates the connection between doing the bad
act and suffering a punishment for it. And delay makes the punishment
uncertain—especially when that delay is not mere dilatoriness, but the
product of appeals by the defendant, appeals which the defendant may
57
actually win.
Of course, it seems to be an open question whether the
deterrent value of executing someone after a dozen years or more

54
55

56
57

only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A
penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959–60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1989)
(“The retributive value of the penalty is diminished as imposition of sentence becomes
ever farther removed from the time of the offense.”). Justice Powell voted for the death
penalty during his tenure on the Court.
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 36 (David Young trans., Hackett Pub.
Co. 1986) (1764).
See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (observing that many of these cases “involve delays which resulted in large part
from the States’ failure to apply constitutionally sufficient procedures at the time of initial
sentencing”).

444

[Vol. 19:2

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

diminishes to zero. Perhaps there is still some minor value to executing
58
someone decades after he has committed the crime. But then we have to
ask: is it really necessary to cause someone to die in order to achieve that
diminished value? And might we also think: haven’t we achieved enough
deterrence by giving that person what is in effect a lengthy prison sentence?
I put aside deterrence for most of the rest of this Article because even
though I think the best theory points to the value of deterrence declining
the more delay there is, this is an empirical question—and I suppose that
people may even stick to their guns and say even a slight deterrence benefit
justifies the death penalty. I am more interested in the retributive argument
here, because it seems more robust and less dependent on empirical
59
evidence.
Either one deserves death or not, and while delay may be
unfortunate, it does not defeat the point of retribution. In fact, I think this
claim is correct, but it needs to be spelled out more, something I do at
length in Part II of this Article. But I need, first, to address two claims about
the second Lackey argument which will help me clarify the exact type of the
argument I am interested in. First, does it matter that the prisoner himself
might be responsible for the delay? Second, can’t we say that the delay in
punishment is obviously retributively unjust because the person who is
ultimately executed will have suffered more than he deserves because he has (a)
been on death row for many years and in addition to that is (b) executed?
Both of these claims have been analyzed recently and incisively by Russell
Christopher, and I use his essays to help situate my interest and my
development of the second Lackey argument. The second point, especially,
is useful in refining the nature of the Lackey claim I will mostly be
60
examining.
61

B. Does it Matter if the Inmate Is Responsible for the Delay?

Here, I need to deal with a key objection to Lackey claims, one that has
62
shown a surprising durability in the lower courts. It is also an argument

58

59
60

61

Justice Stevens says as much in the Lackey memo. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046
(1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Finally, the
additional deterrent effect from an actual execution now, on the one hand, as compared
to 17 years on death row followed by the prisoner’s continued incarceration for life, on
the other, seems minimal.”).
Retribution has also, as I document infra Part III.A., become the “primary” argument in
favor of the death penalty.
This third Lackey claim exists between the first two I mentioned above. It points to the
fact of long delay to show that the punishment is unjust given one theory of punishment,
viz., retribution.
My debt to Russell Christopher’s paper on this subject will be obvious to anyone who has
read it. Russell Christopher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively Delayed Executions,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2015).
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made at length in Justice Thomas’s response to Justices Stevens and Breyer.
The Lackey claim involves a prisoner complaint about delay. But in many
64
cases, that delay is the prisoner’s own fault. After all, he is the one who is—
in most cases—filing appeal after appeal in order to prevent his execution
from happening, and so is at least in part responsible for the delay he is
complaining about. It is chutzpah for the prisoner to turn around and
complain that it has taken such a long time for the state to get around to
65
executing him. For one, he is surely benefitting from the delay that he is
66
getting—he is still alive! Second, he could of course in many cases get on
67
with it already by dropping his appeals and agreeing to be executed. There
is precedent for that. Some on death row get exhausted, give up their
68
appeals, and simply submit to their penalties.

62

63

64

65

66
67

68

See, e.g., Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 n.2 (Ind. 2002) (emphasizing that any delay
was caused by defendant, and not by the state, either intentionally or unintentionally);
Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (noting that delay of execution was
caused by defendant’s “having availed himself of the appeals process”). A near
comprehensive listing of the lower court cases rejecting Lackey claims on this basis can be
found in Christopher, supra note 61, at 20–31; see also id. at 12 n.45.
Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial
of certiorari); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990–91 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the denial of certiorari); Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1071–73 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). As Christopher points out, both Justices
Stevens and Breyer—despite approving Lackey claims in principle—do not entirely seem
to deny the force of Thomas’s argument. Christopher, supra note 61 at 23–28. See, e.g.,
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the
denial of certiorari) (“It may be appropriate to distinguish . . . delays resulting
from . . . petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous
filings . . . .”).
Justice Stevens acknowledged that some of the delay might properly be ignored for this
reason. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial of
certiorari) (citations omitted) (“It may be appropriate to distinguish, for example, among
delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive,
frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c)
negligence or deliberate action by the State. Thus, though English cases indicate that the
prisoner should not be held responsible for delays occurring in the latter two categories,
it is at least arguable that some portion of the time that has elapsed since this petitioner
was first sentenced to death in 1978 should be excluded from the calculus.”).
Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 2, at 25 (“It is somewhat akin to the classic definition of
chutzpah for death penalty opponents to say we can’t execute someone too fast because he
is entitled to a searching review, and then to say what we are doing is immoral when we
delay the execution precisely to afford such review.”) (footnotes omitted). It puts one in
mind of the joke in which a person kills his parents and then asks the court to have mercy
on him because he’s an orphan.
I return to this point in a different context in Part II.
Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner
could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ . . . by submitting to what the
people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.”).
The story of Gary Gilmore, who was ultimately executed for murdering two individuals, is
a case in point. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Gary Gilmore's Lawyers, 32 STAN. L. REV. 865,
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Justice Thomas’s rebuttal to Justices Stevens and Breyer works best,
surely, if the appeals made by the prisoner are largely frivolous and thus in a
69
real sense simply “buying him time.” The argument seems less persuasive
on its face if the appeals are—as they are at least in the early stages in many
states—mandatory, or entirely legitimate. If the delay is occasioned by the
prisoner winning many of his appeals, then the idea that the delay in his
penalty is somehow made in bad faith seems a little more outrageous. The
70
state should take responsibility for some of the delay, at least.
Justice
Breyer has made this sort of defense at an even more abstract level, in both a
legal and an emotional vein. The death row inmate has been given a right
to make his appeals, and surely the court system cannot fault him for
71
asserting those rights that he has been given. Indeed, on the other side,
Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented the many procedural protections that the
72
death row inmate had been given over the years by the Supreme Court —
but if they are there, can the Court legitimately fault the prisoner for
employing them? More viscerally, can we blame someone who is facing his
73
or her death for doing all within his or her power to avoid that fate? It is at
least understandable, even if the underlying legal claims are not the

69

70

71

72

73

865–66 (1980) (“[Gilmore] was arrested, confessed to the killings, had two courtappointed lawyers for his trial, was convicted of first-degree murder, and, the jury finding
no mitigating circumstances, was sentenced to death. He decided to waive his appeals,
and, with the aid of two retained lawyers, embraced the death penalty. He was executed,
the first United States citizen in a decade whose life was taken in payment for his
crimes.”).
For example, Justice Thomas’s lament that “a defendant can avail himself of the panoply
of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed”
only makes sense if the defendant’s actions are assumed to be meritless. Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J. concurring in the denial of certiorari).
See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (“Not only has he, in prison, faced the threat of death for nearly a
generation, but he has experienced that delay because of the State’s own faulty
procedures . . . .”).
Society, too, has an interest in making sure the trial is fair and that the right person gets
punished. A hasty trial may, in many cases, result in a harm to the state as well. See
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 n.15 (1972) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 120 (1966)) (“A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect
both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.”).
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959–60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (complaining that
the Court’s imposition of so many procedural obstacles to the death penalty had made it
impossible for states to effectuate their capital punishment statutes, undercut capital punishment’s deterrent effect, and eroded the integrity of the criminal justice system as a
whole); see also McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that present
death penalty delay “is a consequence of our evolving standards of decency, which
prompt us to provide death row inmates with ample opportunities to contest their
convictions and sentences”).
Cf. State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 1013 (Ind. 2007) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (noting that
the defendant’s goal at the penalty phase is “quite simple: to save his or her life”), decision
clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 2007).
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strongest. They may, at least, be worth a try. And a good attorney may be
74
duty bound to try them. But Russell Christopher has recently shown why
the argument of Justice Thomas doesn’t work—however persuasive it may be
at a rhetorical level. Nor do we need to parse the claims of death row
litigants to see if their delay is made in good faith or in bad faith.
Christopher’s argument shows why good or bad faith doesn’t really matter to
the ultimate justness of the punishment.75 We can start by rephrasing Justice
Thomas’s rebuttal this way: even if the resulting punishment after the delay
is unjust, the fact that the delay that makes the punishment now unjust is the
prisoner’s fault means that, in a sense, he has given up any right to complain
about the resulting (unjust) punishment. Put this way, the problem with
Justice Thomas’s argument becomes more apparent. If a punishment is
unjust, does it really matter how it became unjust? We may begrudge the
prisoner who is able to exploit a loophole in order to make it the case that
the state can no longer execute him justly. But at the end of a day, the state
should not be able to pass an unjust punishment, no matter how that
76
punishment became unjust.
To see this, consider a simple hypothetical taken from an article by
77
Christopher. The state, for whatever reason, agrees to let a prisoner who
has been sentenced to death pick the date of his execution. He can choose
to get it over with (and let’s say that some do) but he can also choose to
delay it for up to thirty years. Maybe an inmate wants to be alive while his
grandchildren are born, or maybe he just wants to put off the inevitable as
long as he can. Or suppose even that some inmates make the choice to put
off the execution entirely in bad faith, because they believe that they can
challenge the punishment as unconstitutional after such a long delay (that
is, they see picking a late date as providing the ground for a Lackey claim).
On this hypothetical, the choice is up to the inmate and we can attribute his
choice of date to as much bad faith as we like. Now, when we get to the date
of the punishment and the prisoner balks, by saying that the punishment is
74

75

76

77

The attorney may also hold out hope that delay will give legislatures and courts time to
reconsider whether the death penalty should be applied in any case—not just in his
client’s case. Thanks to Joe Welling and Joe Perkovich for this point.
Christopher, supra note 61, at 14-15 (arguing that “prisoner fault for delay seems irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment’s concern with placing limits on state-imposed punishment,” and that the rationales purportedly supporting the constitutionality of excessively
delayed executions are unpersuasive).
As Christopher puts it, “there is a gap between the prisoner fault argument addressing
delay, and . . . Lackey claims and the Eighth Amendment addressing punishment. Who is
at fault for the delay does not alter the nature or character of the punishment that the
prisoner receives.” Christopher, supra note 61, at 13–14.
Christopher, supra note 61, at 64–65 n.353 (“Suppose a prisoner chose to be drawn and
quartered, disemboweled, burned at the stake, or tortured by the state. Would the
prisoner’s choice preclude these from being cruel and unusual punishment?”).
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unjust, we still have to consider his claim. We cannot say that he has waived
his right to complain because he chose the date (and could have chosen an
earlier date). When we get to the point of punishing him, the question of
the justness of the punishment is still there—waiting for us, as it were.
Christopher makes the point this way: giving the prisoner the choice of
punishment does not make it the case that he can choose an impermissible
78
punishment. The argument works both with the “how” of punishment as
well as with the “when.” Suppose a choice was given to a prisoner on death
79
row between death by torture and death by electrocution. The fact that a
prisoner may choose to be tortured to death does not make the punishment
80
not cruel and unusual. So too the fact that a prisoner may choose to delay
his execution does not make the punishment not cruel and unusual. It may
be. That is a separate analysis, quite apart from the fact of choice and even
the motivation behind the choice. The prisoner cannot waive his right to be
free from a cruel and unusual punishment. The argument that Justice
Thomas makes, while rhetorically and superficially appealing, is really a nonstarter.

C. A Third Lackey Claim?
Above, I presented the second type of Lackey claim as saying that delay
meant that the purposes of execution would no longer be realized by the
execution. But I was ambiguous on a crucial point. One way of cashing out
the claim would be to say that it would be pointless to execute someone who
is on death row for decades. It would no longer add any deterrent value,
and it wouldn’t fulfill any retributive purpose, either. But one could read it
another way, especially concerning the value of retribution being satisfied or
not. Maybe it is no longer pointless to execute someone who has been
languishing on death row, but it would be excessive. Consider it this way: the
person who is sentenced to execution is sentenced to die; he is not sentenced to
die plus twenty years in prison. So we might imagine a third type of Lackey
claim, viz., that the punishment is proportionally unjust, that the person is
being punished much more than he was sentenced to, and for that reason it
is cruel and unusual. It is not a claim that retribution would be pointless—
because the purpose of retribution would no longer be satisfied—but that
78
79

80

Christopher, supra note 61, at 60 (“[A] defendant’s choice does not transform an
unconstitutional punishment into a constitutional one.”).
As Christopher points out, the Supreme Court, over Justice Stevens’s dissent, has “opened
the door” to the constitutionality of this type of choice in its per curiam opinion in Stewart
v. LaGrand. Id. at 61–62 (citing Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam)
(holding that by choosing lethal gas over lethal injection the defendant waived his right
to challenge whether the gas method violated the Eighth Amendment)).
Again, the example is Christopher’s.
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delay plus execution would be wrong because the person is getting much
more than he deserves, or at least, much more than what he was sentenced
to. If one way of looking at the second Lackey claim is that the execution
wouldn’t fulfill the goal of retribution at all, another way of looking at it is to
say that delay plus execution means that the person is being over-punished,
that there is too much retribution. As Justice Breyer put it at one point
discussing the case of Charles Foster: “If executed, Foster, now 55, will have
been punished both by death and also by more than a generation spent in
81
death row’s twilight.”
Russell Christopher pursues this point as part of an impressive analytical
82
investigation of what a Lackey claim might be. If the delay that happens
before an execution should be construed as punishment, and not mere
delay (and it seems plausible that it should be), then the person who is
executed and has to endure twenty years of prison is getting more than he or
83
she deserves. That would make the punishment disproportional, and thus
84
cruel and unusual. Now, bracketing that the Court has been sparing in its
85
willingness to call sentences disproportionate, and also bracketing the fact
86
that some delay in execution is inevitable —an extreme version of
81

82
83

84
85
86

Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (emphasis added). Another way of phrasing this is to say that the state’s
interest in retribution ought to have been satisfied by the years in prison and the harsh
conditions many face on death row. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1486 (9th
Cir. 1995) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“This delay, coupled with the allegedly harsh and
punitive confinement conditions on death row, arguably satisfies the State’s interest in
exacting retribution.”). See also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1421 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Moreover, after such an extended
time, the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe
punishment already inflicted”). But see infra note 93 for a different interpretation of this
passage.
Christopher, supra note 30, at 453–62 (exploring the argument that delay constitutes
additional punishment).
Judge Fletcher suggests this version of a Lackey claim when he writes (summarizing the
trial court judge’s opinion) that “executing Joe Ceja now after 23 years of incarceration
on death row is too harsh a punishment for his crimes.” Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369–
70 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). But then Judge Fletcher
goes on to say that executing him would be pointless, because the reasons for the
execution “are no longer served by execution.” Id. at 1370. This latter statement is
consistent with the second type of Lackey claim I mentioned above.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment
guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”).
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life
without possibility of parole sentence in a drug possession case).
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (“However critical one may be of these protracted post-trial procedures, it
seems inevitable that there must be a significant period of incarceration on death row
during the interval between sentencing and execution.”). But Justice Stevens goes on to
note that when the delay is “for a prolonged period, the imprisonment during that
period is nevertheless a significant form of punishment.” Id.

450

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

Christopher’s claim would make it disproportionate punishment if a
prisoner was not executed immediately upon receiving a sentence of death—I
think this type of Lackey claim is less interesting than the one I pursue at
length in Part II of my Article. The problem comes in thinking about the
remedy for someone who complains that his new sentence (execution plus
delay, rather than just execution) is disproportionate, and so retributively
87
unjust. Maybe the fact that the delay adds to the punishment makes the
punishment taken as a whole (again, delay plus execution) unjust—but is
the correct, or even the only, remedy to this that the execution not take
place? I take it that the force of a Lackey claim is that it means that the
remedy is not having the execution—that would be cruel and unusual,
because it would be too much punishment. But can this third kind of Lackey
claim get us that result?
Consider what I take to be a similar (or similar enough) claim. A person
is sentenced to five years in prison. However, in the third year of his
sentence, he is badly beaten by a prison guard. He sues, and asks that his
prison sentence be reduced, because if he were to serve his full sentence, he
will have been punished too much—he will have been beaten badly and had
to serve his full punishment. There are certainly some complicated
questions here about remedies, but I believe my point here can bypass at
least some of them. One complication is whether the beating by the prison
guard should be considered punishment at all—such that we can trade off
one aspect of the prisoner’s punishment with it. But let us stipulate that the
beating is an additional punishment. Does it follow that the right remedy to
the fact of the beating is to reduce the term of years the prisoner is facing?
Are the punishments—stipulating, again, that they are both punishments—
commensurable in that way? Not necessarily. We could look at them on
different vectors. We might say that the prisoner didn’t deserve to be beaten,
and we could give him money damages to represent that fact. But we might
still hold on to the fact that prisoner still deserves his five years in prison
because of the crime he committed. We might say, in this vein, that the
punishments are to a certain extent incommensurable. Getting an additional
unjustified punishment of one type does not mean that you should
88
automatically get less of another, justified punishment. As one court has
put it, “When prisoners complain about the conditions in prison, we do not
commute their sentence; we order the conditions ameliorated. If inordinate

87
88

See Dan Markel, Chad Flanders & David Gray, Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice
Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 608–12 (2011) (discussing retributive proportionality).
Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1575 (2012) (arguing for release as a remedy to unconstitutional punishment). But see id.
at 1637 (noting early release as a remedy “has never been seriously considered by courts
or advocates”).
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delay in carrying out an execution is adjudged to be a problem of
constitutional dimension, there may be other remedies that are more
89
appropriate in addressing the harm done.”
If it is not obvious in that example that the punishments are
incommensurable, things get considerably clearer, I think, when we move to
90
term of years sentences as opposed to a sentence of death.
If one is
sentenced to death, (I will have more to say about this later), then the
judgment is of the sort: “you deserve to die.” Can any amount of years add
up to an equivalent punishment? I do not think so. Death is different, and
91
qualitatively so. No amount of some other punishment can add up to a
punishment of death. In other words, death as a punishment and a term of
years as punishment are incommensurable. We cannot satisfy a sentence of
death with a long sentence of a term of years.
Why does this matter? It matters, first, because it may be that even if a
person is sentenced, unjustifiably, to a term of years in prison plus a death
sentence, he still deserves to die for all that. It is not as if the death sentence
becomes unjustified because of that sentence to a certain amount of years.
The death sentence would still be retributively justified; the person has still
been condemned to death. For the retributivist, the person deserved to die
and so he should die. To offer not executing the person as a sort of remedy
would lead to something retributively unjust—it would mean the person not
getting what he deserved. And in so doing, we would replace one sort of
injustice—giving a person years in prison plus what he deserves—with

89
90

91

McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).
It is on this point, I think, that I most differ and depart from Christopher’s analysis. I
think that the retributivist may hold that death is still deserved, even if there is added to it
some amount of undeserved additional punishment. The question then becomes
whether it is disproportionate to keep a person alive when he deserves to die now, or
whether it is in fact a benefit to the person to stay alive just a little bit longer. And there is
a further wrinkle: even if it is not a benefit to the person to stay alive longer, it is unclear
whether the remedy for that lack-of-benefit is to stop the execution, or to compensate the
inmate in some other way. I expand on this analysis in the text.
This is usually applied in the context of “death is final, whereas other punishments are
not, so we need to add extra due process protections in order to make sure we get it
right.” See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one
of only a year or two.”); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Indeed, in its finality, the punishment of death ‘differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100–year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.’”) (quoting id.). But
it seems to me equally applicable in the context of “death in its severity and finality is
utterly unlike any punishment which involves the person still living.” Kant, of course,
famously insisted on this point (as against Beccaria): “There is no similarity between
life . . . and death, hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless death
is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer . . . .” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
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another—not giving the person what he deserves. (Either way we lose. )
The conclusion here has to be something like that it is not the case that the
state’s interest in execution can be satisfied by any additional amount of years.
93
Death and years in prison are fundamentally different punishments. We
have to look elsewhere for a remedy, if such a remedy is to be had. One
thing seems clear: the fact of the extra years in prison in itself can’t be used
as a substitute for an execution, if that is what the person deserves.
But maybe that is not the point. Maybe the point is that the state cannot
give out cruel and unusual punishments. The Constitution does not require
that sentences be just; it mandates that they not be unjust. A disproportionate
punishment is cruel and unusual, and so the state can’t do it. If the only
remedy to the punishment becoming cruel and unusual is not to execute,
94
then the person can’t be executed. The third Lackey claim would push
execution off the table as permissible punishment, because it would literally
be overkill. Maybe it would mean that the person was not punished as much
as he deserved, but again—the Constitution prohibits the disproportionately
harsh punishment, and does not guarantee a punishment that is not
disproportionately lenient.
Here, then, we get to the crux of the matter, and to my rejoinder. The
problem with the third Lackey claim, and one which may doom it, is that it is
not obvious that delay is a bad thing for which the prisoner needs a remedy,
such as money or forgoing the execution altogether. The time the person is
still in prison is time that he is still alive, maybe living under horrible
conditions, but living all the same. Here again the notion of punishment
95
incommensurability is relevant. If nothing is as bad as death, nothing is as

92

93

94

95

Christopher describes this as the problem of irremediability of delay in the context of the
death penalty. In other contexts, delay is either de minimis or remediable, but the only
remedy for delay plus death is to commute the sentence. Christopher, supra note 30, at
424 (“Short of voiding the death sentence, there is no way to give credit to the prisoner
for time served while awaiting execution.”).
Contra Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting
the denial of certiorari) (“[A]fter such an extended time [on death row], the acceptable
state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already
inflicted.”). However, this claim could be read another way, viz., that even though the
state interest in retribution may not be satisfied, it is not acceptable for the state to have
this interest. I advance a version of this claim in Part III, below.
There is however, still this: if money can do the trick as a remedy to the years spent in
prison, then the execution can go on. But see Christopher, supra note 30, at 424
(“Because of the different nature of death row incarceration . . . and capital punishment,
the former cannot be subtracted from the latter.”).
Because I emphasize the incommensurability of death and a term of years as
punishments, my argument is agnostic on whether the additional years spent in prison is
in fact punishment. I assume that it is—and argue nonetheless that the fact of additional
years does (1) not diminish the need for death in order for retribution to be satisfied and
also (2) that being alive in prison is better for the prisoner than dying right away, so the
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bad as death—not even an extended stay in prison. The years of delay are
years that the inmate is not dead. Here the difference between extra years
in prison (however many) is different from a sentence to death. Being in
prison longer would be a bizarre remedy for bad treatment in prison, or even
being mistakenly sentenced to more years in prison than you deserved. But
it is plausible at some level to see a longer prison term as a good thing—
96
even a sort of remedy—if the alternative is death.
Now it does seem a relevant data point that many prisoners choose to file
appeals in part to extend their stays in prison rather than be put to death.
Not that this delay can make the resulting punishment just; we saw that it
cannot. But it may show that it may be better for the inmate to live longer
than to live shorter; that it is better, all things considered, that the inmate be
97
alive than that he be dead. It goes to the question of whether years in prison
plus execution is really disproportionate in the same way that years in prison
plus a beating would be disproportionate. It may be that living longer is a
benefit to the inmate, or at the least not obviously a further injustice, rather
98
than an additional punishment, one that needs to be remedied. It seems
to me plausible to think that being alive in prison is better than death, based
on the fact that death is so different from other punishments—so different
that it can make prison seem a comparatively better deal. If this is right,
then the idea that the punishment is disproportionate is a non-starter. This
does not mean that the execution plus the delay, however, may not be cruel
and unusual in some other way—only that it is not cruel and unusual because
99
it is disproportionate.

96

97

98

99

years in prison do not result in a disproportionate punishment (at least relative to the
alternative, viz., death).
As I examine in Part II.B. below, the intrinsic desert retributivist will insist that each day
the person who deserves to die is left to live is a bad thing—allowing an unjust state of
affairs to persist.
My meaning should not be missed here. The desire for the prisoner to keep on living
rather than die is not dispositive to the argument, for, in fact, some prisoners may prefer to
die. But I think it is an implication of my argument here that the prisoner who wants to
die is wrong about this, because it is better to be alive then to die, even to be alive in
miserable circumstances. Overreliance on actual prisoners’ subjective preferences is the
flaw in the otherwise interesting analysis given by Noah Feldman in Delaying Execution Isn’t
Cruel
and
Unusual,
BLOOMBERG:
VIEW
(May
3,
2016,
12:04
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-03/delaying-execution-isn-t-crueland-unusual.
And suppose we concede that the prisoner is harmed by continuing to live, so that the
time he spends in prison when combined with an execution, is disproportionate. Still, it
does not follow that the remedy to this is to call off the execution. It is important (again)
to separate the question of whether the additional delay is good or bad with the question
of what remedy the prisoner should get. It may be that the additional delay is bad, and in
fact a punishment, but from this it does not follow that he does not deserve execution.
Maybe from the point of view of the retributivist, the punishment is not retributively
ideal—that would be to execute as soon as possible. But my conclusion here is only that
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Thus, for the rest of the Article, I focus on the idea that execution may
be pointless because the purpose of retribution is no longer served after a
long delay, not that the execution may be disproportional. If a too-longdelayed execution is pointless, because it serves no deterrent or retributive
function, the execution is cruel and unusual, and it doesn’t matter why the
delay happened. Nor is the proper remedy for the delay an issue. If the
execution really has no point, then it shouldn’t happen, because to do so
would be cruel and unusual—it is not a question of removing the execution
because having it would make the punishment disproportional. And the
pointlessness of an execution should matter to even those who favor the
death penalty. Presumably, they favor the death penalty because it serves
some purpose. If it no longer did, then they should oppose it. Otherwise,
they are left simply with a form of bloodlust—killing for no reason other
than for killing.
This is different from what the third Lackey claim just discussed. Those
who believed that the death penalty was still deserved, even though
execution would make the punishment disproportionate, might think it
tragic that the only solution to an Eighth Amendment violation was nixing
the execution. They would still see the inmate as deserving death. If delay
made it the case that retribution no longer made sense—that the purpose of
retribution would no longer be served—then maybe those who favor the
death penalty would lament the fact that the death penalty was once justified,
but no longer is. But they could not still see the death penalty as justified, or
at least fully justified, now. So I think this version of the Lackey claim is the
most interesting. In order to fully understand it, though, we have to know
more about what retribution might be.

II. TWO VERSIONS OF RETRIBUTION
My narrow interest in the Lackey claim comes down to the version that
says that executing a person after a long delay makes the execution
pointless. And narrowing things even further, I am interested in the version
of the Lackey claim that says that the retributive purpose of an execution
would no longer be served after a long delay. Elaborating on this version of
a Lackey claim requires us to say what exactly retribution is, so that we can
figure out when punishment serves a retributive purpose and when it does
not. There are many varieties of retributivism, some rather baroque in their

executing someone after too long of a delay would not be disproportionate—and so cruel
and unusual—and would still at least satisfy the requirement that the person who
deserves the death penalty must die.
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But the Supreme Court has made our task here somewhat
complexity.
easier, because over the years it has described retribution as a purpose of
punishment, and in so doing has articulated some assumptions about what
retribution is. As far as I can tell, there are two broad kinds of retribution
101
that the Court talks about when it talks about retribution.
The first version of retribution focuses on punishment’s ability to satisfy
community outrage. Call this the outrage version of retribution. Crime
makes us mad at criminals, and the point of punishment is to satisfy this
outrage. This is a crude sketch (although I will eventually make the case
that this is a rather crude version of retribution), but it pops up regularly in
the Court’s discussion of retribution. The second version of retribution
102
focuses on the offender’s desert.
In this version, retribution requires that
bad people be punished for the bad things they have done. At the extreme,
people who have killed other people may deserve to die. Retribution is not
about pleasing the community, or satisfying its outrage, but about meting
out justice, giving people what they—because of their bad acts—deserve.
Call this intrinsic desert (or intrinsic justice) retribution.
I spend the rest of this Part running the Lackey claim about the
pointlessness of executing someone after a delay with these two versions of
retribution. I will also elaborate on these two kinds of retribution and, when
I think it makes sense, criticize them. The general arc of my argument is
that the Lackey claim works well under the community outrage theory of
retribution—but community outrage retribution is a bad theory of
retribution. The intrinsic desert theory of retribution is much better
philosophically speaking. But the Lackey claim doesn’t work with it—in fact,
it shows the limits of the Lackey claim: if we understand retribution in the
most plausible way, the Lackey claim doesn’t go through, except in one rare
(and telling) case. The best thing to do in this case is to question whether
the state can ever legitimately embrace intrinsic desert retribution as a
purpose of punishment. I develop the argument that it cannot in Part III.

100
101

102

See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979); Nigel Walker, Even
More Varieties of Retribution, 74 PHIL. 595 (1999).
These are both briefly addressed in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)
(“Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as an
attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as
strong with a minor as with an adult.”).
See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87 (2010).
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A. Community Outrage Retribution
In writing about why Lackey claims might work, Justice Breyer most
103
clearly attaches it to a community outrage version of retribution.
In his
recent dissent in Valle v. Florida, this comes out clearly: “I would ask how
often [the] community’s sense of retribution would forcefully insist [on] a
104
death that comes only several decades after the crime was committed.”
105
The argument is fairly straightforward.
If punishment, including the
execution of an inmate, is about satisfying community outrage, then it stands
to reason that the community may become less mad over time. Its anger
may diminish, to the point even of indifference. Suppose someone commits
a horrible crime. There is pressure by the community to find the person
and to punish him. The police find him, he goes to trial, and is sentenced
to death. The community gradually forgets about him, and goes about its
106
business.
Maybe some still remember: the family of the victim; the
107
prosecutor.
But even their anger is considerably diminished. Ten years
103

104

105

106

107

Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067, 1068 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay)
(arguing that a community’s “moral sensibility” must be taken into account when
examining whether the death sentence is the proper punishment for a crime).
Id. (emphasis added); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty’s penological rationale in fact rests almost exclusively
upon a belief in its tendency to deter and upon its ability to satisfy a community’s interest in
retribution.”) (emphasis added), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015); Lackey v. Texas, 514
U.S. 1045, 1045–46 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari)
(asserting that the length of time a prisoner spends while awaiting execution of the death
sentence is a severe punishment in itself, and the actual execution is no more a deterrent
than time spent on death row).
The clearest expression of it can be found in Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent, which I
borrow from here. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
decades-long delays before the execution of a death sentence do not justify such a
penalty, and that with the passage of time, communities may be less inclined to seek
retribution in the form of the death penalty).
Blackstone early on noted this worry: “Delay of execution serves only to separate these
ideas [of the advantages of crime and the risk of punishment]: And then the execution
itself affects the minds of the spectators rather as a terrible sight than as the necessary
consequence of transgression.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404.
Maybe prosecutors do an injustice to family members by holding out the false hope of
“closure” knowing full well the death sentence won’t be executed for decades, if at all.
See, e.g., Allen G. Breed, Victims’ Families Seek Justice, Retribution and Closure from Death
Penalty,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
28,
2014,
6:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/28/death-penalty-victimsfamilies_n_5626141.html (reporting on the reactions of victims’ families after learning
that the prisoners endured inefficient, slow, and painful executions); Susan Bandes, When
Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 1599, 1599 (2000) (quoting a victims’ advocate reporting that families “put their lives
on hold” while “the appeals process drag[s] out”). Bandes also notes a divergence in
“closure” interests of the state and victims. Id. at 1605–06; see also Vik Kanwar, Capital
Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 215, 215–16 (2001) (noting that since death sentences are really prison
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pass; now twenty. His appeals exhausted, the prisoner now gets a notice that
he will be put to death soon. There is a brief flurry of news coverage; some
protestors make last-ditch pleas to the governor for commutation.
Compared to the initial uproar at the time of the commission of the crime,
the community interest, let alone outrage, is muted, and practically non108
What, we might ask, is the point of
existent. It has run itself out.
executing the person anymore? Or is it not more plausible to think that the
109
retributive justification “diminish[es] as the delay lengthens”? Maybe he’s
suffered enough; maybe the community is happy enough just to let the
person languish in prison until he dies. Is it really necessary to go ahead
and kill the inmate? As Judge Fletcher has written, the community outrage
version of retribution seeks to “secure some form of moral and emotional
110
closure to the community.”
But what if the community has already
“secure[d]” this closure prior to the death penalty? Or what if such closure
111
is now impossible or at least “grievously undermined”?
So goes the argument against executing someone after a delay—it would
no longer serve any retributive function, on the theory that if retribution is
meant to slake community outrage, that outrage may—after a long enough
time—no longer need to be slaked. When the Court articulates this theory,
it is clear that it does not want to equate community outrage with a brute
desire for revenge. Indeed, in a contrast that we will have occasion to revisit
(in Part III), the Court insists that, when using punishment as a vehicle of
community outrage, the goal is precisely to prevent the community breaking

108

109
110
111

sentences with a remote chance of execution, the indeterminacy of the death sentence is
not only an obstacle to closure but a source of anxiety and frustration to victims).
Furthermore, long delays and the need for victims to participate in legal procedures
reopens wounds or prevents healing. According to one family member: “You never bury
a loved one who’s been murdered, because the justice system keeps digging them up.”
Id. at 241. The Catholic Church is also skeptical of the ability of the death penalty to
provide “closure”: “For many left behind, a death sentence offers the illusion of closure
and vindication.” The Church’s Anti-Death Penalty Position, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS,
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/death-penalty-capitalpunishment/catholic-campaign-to-end-the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm (last visited Mar.
5, 2016).
See Valle, 564 U.S. at 1068 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (“I would ask how
often that community’s sense of retribution would forcefully insist upon a death that
comes only several decades after the crime was committed.”).
Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial
of certiorari).
Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1998).
State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 64 (Conn. 2015) (“What is clear, however, is that the most
tangible retributive fruit of capital punishment—providing victims and their families with
a sense of respite, empowerment, and closure—is grievously undermined by the
interminable delays in carrying out the sentence imposed.”), reconsideration denied, 124
A.3d 496 (Conn. 2015); Nichols v. Heidle, 725 F.3d 516, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (Martin, J.,
concurring) (delay means providing “no closure for families of the victims”).
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out into a vendetta against the accused. Suppose there is a terrible crime,
but the state does nothing to investigate or put on trial or to punish the
person who is suspected of doing it. In this case, seeing the state fail to act,
the community will take the law into its own hands. It will seek out the
suspect—or the family of the suspect, or the suspect’s compatriots, or all of
them—and enforce a punishment itself. This is a consequence the state
wants to avoid; the state wants to remove revenge from the equation and put
itself between the accused and the community. It wants to stand in for the
community, and be the relatively more restrained version of the
community’s desire to see justice done. It acts to keep the punishment
within bounds, to make sure the suspect is treated fairly, and not arbitrarily.
In other words, the punishment (even and up to an execution) channels the
anger and hatred of the community. It channels it into something more
appropriate, something at least approximating justice. The role of the state
here is precisely to recognize community outrage and its deep basis in human
nature, but also to limit and constrain it, so that things do not get out of
hand.
The Lackey argument, however, also has its basis in human nature.
113
Someone commits a wrong against us. We are angry, for a time. We may
even exact some punishment. But anger and hatred fade. Sometimes they
mature into forgiveness, as we are ready to look at the person who has
harmed us in a new light, one not irredeemably tainted by the wrong he has
done. Sometimes this happens. What usually happens, though, is that time
passes and we forget. We just no longer feel the same things about the
person that we did, especially if we are not in continual contact with that
person. We move on with our lives. But if this is true of our sentiments, and
if the reason we punish is that we need our feelings to be satisfied or
validated, what happens when those feelings change? What happens when
114
we are no longer outraged? Maybe, in the case of criminal justice, we keep
the person in prison for reasons of incapacitation or deterrence. But the
original reason, the reason that made us so in need of seeing this person
punished or even to suffer, is gone. Now, is it implausible to think that this
may happen in the case of the death penalty? We start out very angry; we
want to see this person not just punished but punished in the worst way
112

113

114

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“When people
begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal
offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of selfhelp, vigilant justice, and lynch law.”).
Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch, Blameworthiness and Time, LEGAL THEORY 1, 5 (2012)
(examining “the ways in which the passage of time affects both the moral significance of
what we have done and the correctness of our responses to those doings”).
See Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2769 (2015)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Feelings of outrage may have subsided.”).
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possible—we want to see him or her dead. The person is placed on death
row, and then ten years pass; then twenty, or more. The anger is replaced
with some sort of rough reconciliation with the facts of what has happened,
or in any case the anger is no longer red hot. What then is the purpose of
going on with the execution? Maybe our anger has been satisfied by the
person languishing on death row and so we don’t see the need for any more
punishment. Maybe it is enough that the person die on death row, but we
may not feel the need to see him executed anymore. In either case, the
need to mete out the ultimate punishment (death) doesn’t have the same
force it did. The execution seems now an empty ritual—a promise we made
a long time ago, and which now we no longer may feel is worth fulfilling.
The force of this argument depends crucially on getting what we mean
by retribution right, and finding that version of retribution plausible and
115
palatable. Is it? I think there are a few problems. First, we have to analyze
whether this version of retribution is getting what we are feeling right when we
are feeling angry about punishing someone. What do we want? The
community outrage version of retribution, the one relied on by some of the
Lackey claim proponents, seems to say something like: the reason we punish
116
is that we want to see our anger expressed and, by punishment, satisfied.
117
We want to see that a person is punished so that we are ourselves sated. The
state, on this picture of retribution, also sees punishment in this light. If the
state does not punish, then the community’s outrage might get out of
control; it may see itself having to deal with angry citizens trying to take the
law into their own hands. In short, the community outrage sees the point of
punishment as taming or satisfying or channeling the community’s potentially
volatile emotions. Punishment bottoms out in subjective feelings, not in
anything objective—at least if community outrage is what we are focusing
on. This view at least has the virtue of understanding why time matters in
executing someone. The longer we wait, the better the chances that our
118
feelings will have changed, or gone away altogether.
115

116

117

118

The arguments I advance here also make me skeptical—in a more philosophical vein—
about tying our ideas about blameworthiness too closely to our reactive attitudes. For a
sensitive examination of this point (with a focus on how time affects our outrage), see
Coleman & Sarch, supra note 113; see also Chad Flanders, Responsibility and Objectivity
(2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (describing retribution as “an
expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct”) (emphasis
added).
This focus on what the community feels—as opposed to what it believes is just—is
especially clear in Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (noting the
“community’s sense of retribution” and its “feelings of outrage” and the possibility that
these things may “attenuate” over time).
See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“At the same time, the longer the delay, the weaker the justification for
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But it is debatable that community outrage retribution gets right what we
are actually feeling when we feel anger or hatred about someone who has
done us wrong. Certainly we have emotions, and we may feel better when
something is done to appease those emotions. But we are also making a
119
judgment, at least implicitly—aren’t we? We are saying that the person who
has done us wrong deserves to suffer, or even that it would be good or fitting
120
that the person suffer for what he has done. Our emotions aren’t just raw
feelings, which need to be dealt with (although they are surely that); they
are also implicitly claims about what should happen. The point of
punishment is not merely to channel those emotions but in some sense to
vindicate them, or more properly to vindicate the judgment embodied in
121
them.
The community outrage version of retribution sells our emotions
short. It treats those emotions as ends in themselves, when they are in fact
much more than that, even nobler than that. They have a reason to them—
maybe a reason we only see dimly ourselves—but a reason nonetheless.
To see how this is so, consider how, if the community outrage theory of
retribution is right, the Lackey claim may still not work. It is certainly at least
an empirical question as to whether our outrage really will fade after many
years. Isn’t it possible that a community could, after many years, still gather
up the anger and hatred against a person who has committed a vicious
crime? Maybe the community remembers every year the date the crime was
committed, and its anger—far from fading—seems to grow ever hotter as
the person is still not executed. Or maybe the community does tend to
forget, but then the anger again is renewed as it looks like the person finally

119

120

121

imposing the death penalty in terms of punishment’s basic retributive or deterrent
purposes.”).
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270 (1996) (“Emotions are ubiquitous in criminal law, as they are in
life. But how do they, and how should they, affect legal assessment? Should the law be
more sympathetic to defendants who are taken over by passions such as anger and fear,
or should it view such defendants as especially dangerous? Or should the response of the
law depend on an appraisal of the emotion itself—whether it is appropriate or
inappropriate, ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’? What does it mean for an emotion to be
reasonable? Aren’t emotions, after all, just disturbances of the personality that can be
more or less strong but that are always hostile to reason? Or do they embody judgments,
ways of seeing the world? If they do, should we hold people morally accountable for those
judgments?”).
I qualify this point a bit, later, when I write that what in fact we believe a person deserves
is to be caused to suffer by us, not just to have some suffering befall him. See also Chad
Flanders, Adam Smith’s Jurisprudence: Resentment, Punishment, and Justice, in ADAM SMITH:
HIS LIFE, HIS THOUGHT, HIS LEGACY 371 (Ryan Patrick Hanley ed., 2016) for this
distinction.
See Chad Flanders, In Defense of Punishment Theory, and Contra Stephen: A Reply to
DeGirolami, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 243, 252–54 (2012) (explaining the distinction
between punishment as a mere gratification of hatred towards a criminal and punishment
as “validating these feelings”).

Dec. 2016]

TIME, DEATH, AND RETRIBUTION

461

will be executed; people are reminded again how much that person has
harmed the community. In these scenarios, the Lackey claim wouldn’t work:
“You thought that our outrage would disappear, but look it hasn’t—it was
there all along, albeit slightly below the surface. We still demand that you
heed our feelings, and execute this person!” If the community outrage
version of retribution is right, then the success or failure of the Lackey claim
is not settled; it just depends. It depends on whether we are still outraged,
or whether we can gather up that outrage again. If we are still outraged,
then maybe we do need to punish the person by execution, even many, many
years after the crime was committed.
The community outrage version of retribution also has problems, if
considered as a general theory of punishment. Suppose someone kills a
particularly disfavored member of the community; there is no outrage. Does
it follow the person shouldn’t be punished? If we are retributivists, this seems
an unpalatable result—it seems to make retribution depend on contingent
judgments of a person’s value to the community, which at times could come
to seem arbitrary. And this again is the problem with looking at the main
thing as being the community’s outrage itself, rather than the judgment that
outrage may contain. If the main thing is the judgment, then we can
sometimes say to the community: “A horrible crime has been committed
here, which we should all see as a horrible crime that deserves
punishment—we really should feel outraged!” If all that matters are the
feelings of the community, then we can’t say this. Maybe we can try to stoke
outrage, but we cannot criticize the community for not feeling outraged—it
122
feels what it feels.
I don’t think this “outrage” version of retribution
captures what we are actually feeling, and it does not get at what is appealing
about retribution. Retribution is about a judgment about what people
deserve, not a statement about what the community feels. If it was just about
community feeling, then the answer to crime might not need to be
punishment, but something that distracted the community from its feelings,
to make those feelings fade and for the community to forget about the
123
terrible thing that has been done.
Punishment drops out as essentially
related to crime; crime just demands that people’s emotions be managed in
some way or another, not that crime be punished. The necessary link
122
123

Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 119, at 278–80 (describing the mechanistic view of
emotion).
See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 624
(2006) (arguing that conventional punishment by imprisonment can sometimes work
against purging public anger). “I am not at all convinced that our emotions work this
way. Why couldn’t we become increasingly compassionate, rather than just shifting
around a fixed quantity of hatred? This seems an unduly pessimistic view. And, even if
Kahan and Stephen are right, why couldn’t our illiberal emotions be diverted (to
sporting events, for example) or sublimated altogether?” Id. at 635.

462

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

between an offender’s crime and an offender’s punishment isn’t there on
the community outrage version of retribution. It’s just not a plausible
theory of punishment, even if, sometimes as a contingent matter, it may
make sense of some Lackey claims. I suggest we look elsewhere.

B. Intrinsic Desert Retribution
Fortunately, there is an alternative to community outrage retributivism,
and it is better, philosophically, than that version. This version—which I’ll
call intrinsic desert retributivism—takes seriously the judgment at the bottom
of the community’s outrage at the person who has committed the crime.
The point of punishment, the intrinsic desert retributivist says, is that the
person get what he or she deserves. If the person is not punished as much as
desert says he or she should be punished, or is punished less, then
retribution has not been satisfied—no matter what the community thinks. If
the community thinks a person should be executed, but his crime doesn’t
merit that, then the person shouldn’t be executed, even if it means that the
124
community will take the law into its own hands.
Kant is probably the
paradigm of an intrinsic desert theorist. He famously said that even if an
island was about to disband, and a person still needed to be executed, then
the island, as possibly its very last act, should kill that person. That person
deserved to die.125 Even if the community had forgotten about that person,
because he had been languishing on death row; even if the community has
better things to do, the community ought to go ahead with the execution.
To fail to do so would be an injustice—it would be wrong. It would be
wrong because the person, because of his crime, deserved the punishment.
Failure to give him his punishment—to give him what he deserved—would
be a sin against justice. Justice stands apart from what we feel, and what we
happen to be concerned about at the moment. It has its own logic and its
own demands, which we might hope that community sentiment would track,
but if it doesn’t, then so much the worse for community sentiment. As the
Court affirmed in Gregg v. Georgia, “[t]he truth is that some crimes are so
outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong126
doer deserves it.”
But this version of retribution, even though it may be more
philosophically appealing, may not offer much support for a Lackey claim. If
124

125
126

Justice Breyer, in particular, seems to focus on the Court’s duty to placate the
community’s thirst for retribution rather than its duty to find independently a need for
retribution (intrinsic desert retribution). Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
See KANT, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.30 (1976) (quoting Lord Justice Denning, speaking
before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment).
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a person deserves to die, then he deserves to die, and no amount of delay is
really relevant to that. It may be the case that it is better if the person is
executed sooner rather than later. Patrick Tomlin has recently advanced
127
For
this sort of argument, in the context of retribution more generally.
intrinsic desert retribution, each day a person is not given what he deserves,
128
the time is out of joint—the universe is unbalanced. It is bad when people
do not get what they deserve, and so we should consider it somewhat
pressing that we do give them what they deserve. Delay in executing
someone who deserves death is a delay in justice being done. It is not clear
to me that this injustice aggregates over time: is each passing day an
additional injustice, or is it the same injustice as it was before? It may be that
each passing day of delay makes the victims of the crime all the more
aggrieved or the community angrier, but it is not clear that each day of delay
129
an additional injustice is being done to them or to the inmate who also is
not getting his “just deserts.” But regardless of whether the injustice increases or stays the same during a long delay, one point is clear: the person
still deserves to die. Even though it might be better (even better from the
standpoint of justice) that the person be executed sooner rather than later,
this doesn’t change the fact that the person sentenced to die really deserves to
die at some time. As one court has said: “Insofar as the ‘just deserts’ theory
holds certain murderers do not deserve a fate better than that inflicted on
their victims, the passage of time and alteration of circumstances have no
130
bearing on this retributive imperative.”
But there may be two ways in which even intrinsic desert retributivism
may give some legitimacy to a Lackey claim. I deal with one of those ways
briefly now, and the second one I deal with at length in the next section
because it will provide the basis for a much longer discussion in Part III
about whether intrinsic desert retribution could ever be a proper purpose
for the state to pursue. In other words, the upshot of my argument in this
part and the next will be that even if the best version of retribution prevents a
Lackey claim from going through, the best version of retribution may not be
suitable as a goal for the state to advance. Before we get to that, however, I
want to consider a not-implausible way in which we may think that delay
matters to someone deserving a punishment.
127

128

129
130

Patrick Tomlin, Time and Retribution, 33 LAW & PHIL 655, 662 (2014) (arguing that
“retributivists should prefer the guilty to be punished quickly”). I don’t claim to capture
Tomlin’s argument in all its sophistication here, and in fact I agree with much of it.
As Tomlin phrases it at one point, we might think “whilst we are waiting for [a] deserved
punishment to be delivered . . . this is a bad state of affairs, since there is a retributive
injustice which is yet to be rectified. The longer this state of affairs persists, the worse
things are.” Id. at 671.
See id.
People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal. 2001).
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Suppose it were possible that a person, while he is awaiting execution,
could have his desert status changed. Maybe he has undergone a religious
conversion, and now repents of his former ways. Or maybe he has just
undergone a gradual process of reform, so that now he is in some real sense
a different person. Or perhaps the passage of time has disconnected him,
131
Is it now fair to say that this person, the
psychologically, from his crime.
person who twenty years later has changed so much, really is the person who
committed the crime, really now deserves to die? Justice Breyer, at least in
132
passing, has suggested this possibility.
In context, he may be tying it to a
community outrage version of retribution. The person has changed, so we
are no longer as mad at him as we used to be—we can’t be, because “he” is
not the same person he was. But we can also run the “change in identity”
theory through an intrinsic desert retribution lens. The person has
changed, and so we can say that this person now no longer deserves to be
133
executed. It follows, then, that intrinsic retribution would not be satisfied
after such a long delay, and where such a change has happened. We could
134
win a Lackey claim under such a theory.
Executing a person who is no
longer the same person is pointless; it is not justified by intrinsic retribution, so
going ahead with the execution would be cruel and unusual.
The personal identity theory that this claim requires is interesting, but
not obviously right, either as a metaphysical matter or as a matter of
describing how our criminal justice system operates. I put my focus mainly
on the latter point. It is true that we reconsider sentences—we may think
that someone is eligible for early release, based on that person having
rehabilitated him- or herself. Sometimes this can be phrased in terms of
desert: the person no longer “deserves” to be in jail. But I wonder if the
determination in these cases is for other reasons, compatible with saying that
the person is still getting what she deserves. An early release determination
could simply mean that the person no longer needs to be locked up because
she is no longer a danger to the community. Or maybe the “second look” at
the sentence reveals that the sentence was in some sense originally

131
132
133

134

DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 177–80 (1984) (exploring the effects of the passage
of time on reason and a “bias towards the future”).
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2769 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The offender may
have found himself a changed human being.”).
“After such lengthy delays, scholars have questioned whether there can be any true
retribution when the middle aged inmate who goes to the gallows bears little
resemblance to the individual who offended years before.” State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1,
63 (Conn. 2015). See also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing various
sources on this point).
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how if the goals of
deterrence and retribution are not filled, the death penalty becomes an unconstitutional
punishment).
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retributively wrong. The initial sentence was too harsh, which we now see—
we thought the defendant wasn’t remorseful, but he was, or maybe some
new evidence shows a diminished responsibility for the crime. Both of these
things are compatible with saying that the retributive purpose of the
punishment has still been served, even if the person is released early. If a
person is sentenced to death for reasons of safety rather than for reasons of
desert, then of course commuting the death penalty would be consistent
with—and perhaps even demanded by—retribution. And if new evidence
demonstrated that the person did not commit the crime or was not as big a
participant in the crime as was originally thought, then intrinsic desert
retribution would be perfectly fine with changing the punishment, including
changing the punishment from death to a prison sentence.
Our criminal justice system operates for the most part on the idea that
we can judge people for a bad act and give them a punishment that they
must fulfill, in order for retribution to be satisfied. The criminal justice
system does not normally believe that people change and so we must
continually calibrate punishments accordingly, in case a person’s identity
changes. The default is instead that the person should stay in prison for his
or her entire sentence, subject to some exceptions. In other words, the
picture of personal identity generally in place in our criminal justice system
does not buy into the “change in identity” theory.135 At the extreme, a
136
person who goes insane may not be executed.
But we have this rule not
necessarily because the person has changed, so he is somehow not the same
person who committed the crime: we do not execute the insane because it
would be cruel.137 Our criminal justice system is more than happy to
condemn a person for the rest of his life—even to his death—for something
bad he did as an adult. If we except juveniles from this, as we do, it is
because we are not really sure that the act of the child demonstrated a fully
responsible act, so that we wonder if the juvenile really deserves to be
138
condemned for the rest of his life for something he did as a child. Adults
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ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM 69 (2009) (arguing that “[w]hatever fundamental changes characters undergo, the identity that persists through them is that of
their formal agency,” and that because the agent—as the bearer of responsibility for
deeds it chose—“is so abstract and characterless, it can persist throughout changes of
character, so that judicial punishment is not undeserved just because the character clothing the agent has changed or because the agent chose an action unreflective of its character”).
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
Id. at 407 (“[T]he execution of an insane person simply offends humanity.”).
See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing why we exclude both
the insane and juveniles from execution); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571
(2005) (explaining that the case for retribution for juveniles is weaker because
“[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one
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do not get such an out. They are made to suffer for the rest of their lives,
even if they are exemplary prisoners, show remorse, or do good deeds for
the outside world. We stick people with their past deeds in our criminal
justice system, to the point that they can, in some sense, never really shake
them from their identity. So it does not seem as if our criminal justice
system is ready to buy into the theory of identity that this version of the
Lackey claim needs to work. Our criminal justice system is perfectly fine with
sentencing someone based on his or her culpability at the time of the
offense committed, even if this means decades (and indeed, the rest of one’s
139
life). Of course, things could change—but it does not seem as if they will
anytime soon.

C. Dying in Prison
I have not yet remarked upon one of the more important facts about the
death penalty today, which is that most of those on death row, a great
majority of them, are never actually executed. It is not because they are
140
pardoned, or win their appeals. Instead, they die in prison.
Thus, many
have said, rightly, that if you are sentenced to death, it is more likely that you
will die in prison than you will actually be executed by the state and that “for
all practical purposes . . . a sentence of death in California is a sentence of
141
life imprisonment with the remote possibility of death . . . .” Now, this fact
should trouble those who believe in intrinsic desert retribution. If long
delays in the imposition of the death penalty mean that people are dying in
prison instead of being executed, then they are not getting what they
142
deserve.
They are cheating their punishment, in the same way as if,
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whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of
youth and immaturity”).
See Allen, 435 F.3d at 952 (“Allen’s age and infirmity do not render him less culpable at the
time of his offenses . . . .”) (emphasis added); Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row#drs (last visited Mar. 4, 2016)
(providing statistics on the time inmates spend awaiting execution).
Christopher, supra note 30, at 421 (“In many of the top death penalty states, the leading
cause of death for prisoners on death row is not lethal injection. Nor is it the electric
chair. It is not even any form of execution. It is death by natural and other causes.”);
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Indeed, the most common
way out of California’s Death Row is not death by State execution, but death by other
means. Of the 511 individuals sentenced to death between 1978 and 1997, 79 died of
natural causes, suicide, or causes other than execution by the State of California.
Another 15 sentenced after 1997—or two more than the total number of inmates that
have been executed by California since the current death penalty system took form—have
died of non-execution causes.”) (citations omitted).
Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062.
Tomlin, supra note 127, at 674 (“The most obvious way in which we potentially risk
injustice by delaying the full delivery of punishment is that people may die. . . . The
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moments before their execution, they had run away—only to be eaten by a
wild animal. There is a presupposition that becomes evident in making this
point, a presupposition that I believe is essential to intrinsic desert
retribution: those who do bad things do not merely deserve bad things to
happen to them, which they suffer in some way. Rather, those who do bad
143
things deserve punishment. The intrinsic desert retribution theory, if it is
to be taken as a theory of state punishment, and not just a sort of a
metaphysical theory about good and evil, needs to have something like this
presupposition. A person who commits a crime as it is defined by the state,
and in doing so offends the state and its citizens, deserves to be punished at
the hands of the state and not just to have someone hurt him or have bad
things befall him. There needs to be a kind of symmetry in the offense,
which is against the state, and the nature of the punishment, which is
exacted by the state.
144
This is a point that I think many have missed.
But an example will
help show the point. Suppose a person has committed a bank robbery, and
is able to escape. During the escape he is badly injured, and briefly himself
kidnapped and held by a stranger—unable to leave, and given very little to
eat. Eventually, the bank robber is captured, tried, and found guilty. Can
the bank robber at his sentencing hearing appeal to the fact that he was
injured or kidnapped after he committed his crime? He might appeal to the
mercy of the judge and say: “Your honor, certainly I have already suffered
enough. Put aside my very bad leg injury, which I thought was God’s way of
telling me I had done something wrong. But the kidnapping was the worst.
I have already known the horrors of being deprived of my freedom. Please
145
show leniency on me.” It seems that the judge could reply, in turn: “I feel
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144
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longer we leave the full delivery of deserved punishment, the greater the possibility that
this bad state of affairs will come about.”).
Chad Flanders & Dan Markel, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to
Retributive Justice, 98 CAL. L. REV. 907, 965–66 (2010) (disputing Shawn Bayern’s
contention that if a state acknowledges suffering from some other source, punishment by
the state is not required).
Contra Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 971–72
(2000). I do not think our retributive emotions are (or should be) satisfied by knowledge
that the wrongdoer has suffered rather than been punished. See Flanders & Markel, supra
note 143, at 965–66. (I cannot pretend to have given the full argument for my conclusion
here, however). But see id. at 966–67.
Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for A Fair-Play Analysis of
Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2009) (using a similar hypothetical to explore
the importance of the “punisher” being the state); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative
Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1593 (2009) (arguing that punishment
proportionality should be measured in terms of the subjective deprivation suffered by the
convict, suggesting that measuring degree of deprivation from the state’s perspective
might over-punish by not taking into account deprivation from other sources including
characteristics of the convict).
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sorry for you, certainly. But your crime means that you have a debt to pay to
society. And our laws say that for your crime, you must spend three years in
prison, and so that is what you will get.” Maybe the judge could show some
mercy, but she need not; she could stick to the prescribed sentence on the
books. She need not, in other words, take the bank robber’s previous
suffering at all into account. Why should she? Here again we have to return
to the fact of incommensurability. Above, we discussed how it may be that
spending time in prison could not be traded off with death. A prisoner
could not say: “It is enough that I have suffered this many years in prison; it
is not fair now that you, in addition, execute me.” Now we face a different
kind of incommensurability—the incommensurability of suffering and
punishment. What the bank robber owes to society in the form of
punishment is not something that can be paid in terms of other suffering—
he could not self-flagellate in order to reduce the number of years he might
be sentenced. He must actually pay the debt he owes to society in the form of a
punishment imposed on him by society. You can’t pay that debt with some other
sort of suffering that you happen to have undergone.
We need to tie this back to the Lackey issue, and say why it matters. On
the theory of intrinsic retribution, a person deserves to be punished, and it is
a failure of justice if that person is not punished. If a person deserves to die
as a result of what he has done, he deserves to die, and no amount of other
suffering will do. But maybe we can make a Lackey claim along the following
lines. Suppose an inmate has been sentenced to death, but due to appeals
and just the inherently slow nature of the machinery of justice, the delay
lasts years, decades. He is now on his deathbed, just barely alive and
moments away from death. However, it is also at this moment that his
appeals have been exhausted and the state says he must be put to death.
Can his attorney argue that execution at this point is pointless? He is about
to die anyway, under the watchful eye of the state—and what the state wants
to do would at most cut his life off by a matter of minutes. Here, if anywhere,
the Lackey argument that the execution would be pointless seems to have
some real bite. What possible state interest could be satisfied by taking a
dying man on his death bed and hooking him up to be executed? We might
say that the punishment that the person has gotten to that point is good
enough or at least close enough to satisfy any interest the state has, even in
intrinsic retribution. Let the person die naturally; it would not be serving
any purpose of punishment to instead have the person be executed.
146
But here the intrinsic desert retributivist may instead dig in his heels.
If we buy that intrinsic desert means that the person does not simply deserve

146

And it looks like present practice supports him. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,
179 (2003) (holding that the Constitution allows the government to forcibly administer
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to suffer some bad thing, but to actually suffer punishment and moreover
punishment at the hands of the state, a natural death and a death by
execution cannot be traded off with one another. If the sentence is one of
death by the state—by means of execution—then the person who instead
dies in prison of natural causes is not getting what he deserves. He is, in a
way, cheating his punishment. Maybe the intrinsic desert retributivist will
not go ahead with the execution for reasons of mercy or sympathy. But in
these cases, there would be values that would outweigh the value of just
punishment—they would not show that the retribution in itself would be
147
pointless.
The fact of the matter would still be that the person deserves to
be put to death, and that not executing would be a failure of desert. A
Lackey claim under these circumstances would fail, at least if we believe that
the purpose of retribution is to give people what they deserve, because the
person still should be executed, even if he is shortly to die anyway. The only
way a Lackey claim would work is if the person had died already by natural
causes—then it really would be pointless to execute him. But for obvious
reasons, no one would make this type of claim (because he would be dead).
I conclude, then, that on the best version of retributive theory—the intrinsic
desert theory—delay cannot render an execution pointless if the inmate
deserves death. Indeed, delay even up to the very moment before death does not
remove the retributive value of executing the person.

III. IS RETRIBUTION A LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSE?
If we stick with intrinsic desert retribution, it is hard to see that a delay in
execution, while it may not be all that desirable (it would be better if justice
were done sooner rather than later), would not make the execution pointless.
If justice demands that a person be executed by the state, then that person
should be executed, because he deserves to die. Even if the person is on his

147

antipsychotic drugs to render a person competent to stand trial when the treatment is
otherwise medically appropriate and the treatment will further a compelling state interest
in the prosecution); Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the rule from Sell applies when the state interest is rendering a person
otherwise death-ineligible under Ford competent to be executed); see also STEPHEN
TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY
108, 110–12 (1992) (detailing the Missouri execution protocol, including the fact that
inmates under a death warrant are moved to isolation or “administrative segregation” to
prevent suicides on the eve of scheduled executions).
Such an appeal may be what drives Justice Breyer’s claim in Allen that it would be cruel
and unusual to execute a person who is “76 years old, is blind, suffers from diabetes, is
confined to a wheelchair, and has been on death row for 23 years.” Allen v. Ornoski, 546
U.S. 1136, 1140 (2006) (Breyer, J, dissenting). A hard core retributivist may say: “It may
be sad, but the person still deserves to die at the hands of the state—even if out of mercy we
choose to spare them that fate.” David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1619, 1692 (2010) (striking just such a note).
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deathbed, and will die anyway, he should still be killed because his sentence
was not to die in prison, but to suffer execution at the hands of the state. In
a way, this implication of the intrinsic desert retributivist’s position should
148
not be surprising. It is simply something entailed by Kant’s position. Kant
said we should give the death penalty to a person who deserved it even if the
149
community was disbanding the next day.
There was no point to his
execution: no gratification of people’s emotions (they had other things on
their mind); no need to prevent revenge spilling out into public; no need to
deter others from committing a similar crime (again, no one is paying
attention). The killing looks pointless in every possible way, except from the
point of view of retributive desert. Justice would not be done if the
execution were not carried out. So too would it be wrong to let the death
row inmate simply die rather than executing him. This all makes sense if one
looks at things from the perspective of desert. When we execute the person,
rather than letting him go or letting him die, we are making sure (even at
the very end of his life) that he gets what he deserves.
In this Part, I raise the question of whether satisfying this idea of intrinsic
150
desert is, after all, a legitimate state purpose.
There has not been much
sustained discussion of what purposes of punishment are legitimate for the
state to pursue. This is in part because many people do not look at desert
from the point of view of politics—that is, in terms of what the state can
do—but rather of moral philosophy. If the punishment serves a legitimate
moral purpose, then for many philosophers, the inquiry is nearly at an end.151
I disagree deeply with this point of view. The state is the entity that
punishes, and so we are not done with our inquiry by merely asking whether
there is some moral purpose to punishment. We have to go on to ask
whether this purpose is something that the state can legitimately pursue. But
here again we may run into a problem. The Supreme Court, in its
discussions of sentencing, and of the death penalty in particular, has said
pretty clearly that certain purposes of punishment are permissible for the
state to pursue. It has also indicated, more generally, its tendency to defer
to the state in deciding for what purpose it punishes. Retribution seems to
always make that list, along with deterrence. If there is to be a convincing
argument that retribution—meting out desert—is a legitimate state purpose,
then we need to dislodge the intuition that retribution has to be on this
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See KANT, supra note 20, at 140.
Id.
See Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309, 313 (2014)
(questioning whether retribution is a permissible state purpose); Chad Flanders, Public
Reason and Public Wrongs, 55 DIALOGUE 45 (2016).
See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 153--54
(1997).
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152

I do this first by noting how contingent the list of purposes of
list.
punishment has been in the Supreme Court. I then suggest two reasons why
retribution may not be a permissible state purpose of punishment, making
two analogies: I first analogize the state pursuing retribution to the state
establishing a religion. Second, I suggest that executing someone for the
sake of desert, especially in the scenario where the person is on his
deathbed, may not be the product of “reason” but rather only “animus.”

A. Purposes of Punishment and the Supreme Court
Given how regularly the purposes of deterrence and retribution appear
in the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, it is worth reminding
ourselves that this was not always the case. In the second half of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court on many occasions said things
suggesting that not only was retribution, in particular, on the way out as a
purpose of punishment, but also it might even be the case that retribution
could not be a permissible purpose of punishment. In Williams v. New York,
for instance, the Court in several places indicated that retribution was on its
way out, to be replaced by rehabilitation and reform of offenders:
“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,” it
153
wrote.
“Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
154
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”
Here it may be objected that
the Court is just making a survey of what is happening on the ground, and
not necessarily endorsing that trend. This seems belied by the Williams
opinion itself. Moreover, it is not too hard to discern a narrative emerging
out of the Court’s cases in the 60s and 70s that points to a larger
155
dissatisfaction with retribution.
That narrative would go something like this: public safety and deterrence
seem important, and rehabilitation seems to be the ideal, but retribution,
the Court comes close to saying, is on the way out, and deservedly so.156 Our
152
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Justice Thomas, in replying to Justices Stevens and Breyer, alleged that their
disagreements “boil down to policy disagreements with the Constitution and the . . .
Legislature.” Johnson v. Bredeson, 558 U.S. 1067, 1072 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari). But not all policy disagreements are the same; some justifications
for some policies may run afoul of the Constitution.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
Id.; see also Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA. L. REV. 383,
395 (2015) (discussing the rise of rehabilitation in the Court’s jurisprudence).
This narrative is hinted at by Justice Thurgood Marshall when he writes in Furman that
“[t]o preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has consistently
denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment.” Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 344 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 (asserting that the primary objective of criminal law is no longer
retribution, as “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals of criminal jurisprudence”).
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standards are evolving away from it, and the more they do so, the more
appropriate it is for the Court to not only disparage but also to reject
retribution as a permissible purpose the state can have in punishing
someone. Retribution is a relic of a past age, a more brutal and barbaric
157
It is inconsistent with treating human beings with dignity—it seems
one.
punishment is just being pursued for punishment’s sake. But this gives up
on the possibility of human beings to change and to grow and to get better.
Punishment may be justified as a sad necessity to protect society; that is one
thing. It is another thing altogether to say this person just deserves to suffer for
no reason other than that he deserves it.
This perspective on retribution all changed after the backlash against the
158
Court’s decision in Furman.
Furman had held that the application of the
death penalty was cruel and unusual because of the way it was being
159
applied. If the death penalty were given to people not necessarily because
they had committed the worst crimes, but just as—to a certain degree—a
matter of luck, then we could not say that such a policy was really fulfilling
160
any legitimate aim of punishment. Some of the Justices who concurred in
the opinion wanted to say that death never could satisfy a legitimate aim of
161
punishment, that death was always excessive or always cruel.
The
dissenters said that the Constitution could not be read in a way that forbade
162
the imposition of the death penalty for purely “retributive” reasons.
Those who objected to retribution as cruel and unusual did not prevail
in Furman, and the dissenters in that case were vindicated a few years later.
The dissenters in Furman talked about retribution as having always been at
163
least a permissible purpose of punishment.
They rejected the concurring
justices in Furman as mistakenly seeing retribution itself as contrary to the
164
Eighth Amendment. And it is in Gregg that retribution not only appears as
a not “forbidden” objective of punishment, but it is also one that is not
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See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1957) (Brennan, J., concurring) (equating
retribution with “naked vengeance”).
See EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 264–80 (2013) (examining the backlash against Furman, which
included an increase in violent crime, an increase in fear of crime, and a dramatic
increase in support for the death penalty).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 293, 300–05 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 311–13 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall was first and foremost in this. See, e.g., id. at 343 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (“Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries,
and the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming
synonymous with vengeance.”).
Id. at 394–95 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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Retribution is
“inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.”
important to channel society’s outrage (the community outrage theory) but
it is also “an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are
themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
166
response may be the penalty of death.”
This is very close to an exact
statement of intrinsic desert retribution—that we must punish others as this
is the only way to give them what they deserve, that this is the only
appropriate way to respond to them, to get them back for what they have
167
done. After Gregg, there is no serious debate as to whether retribution is at
least a permissible purpose of punishment; indeed after Gregg, it becomes
possible to think of retribution as again the dominant purpose of
168
punishment, especially when it comes to the penalty of death. Deterrence
may be an open question, but retribution does not depend on the facts
being one way or another. It just depends on our intuitions of justice. Even
in his rejection of the death penalty tout court in Glossip v. Gross, Justice
169
Breyer pauses to acknowledge that “retribution is a valid penological goal.”
Nonetheless, the debate in Furman, despite being eventually resolved in
favor of retribution as a purpose of punishment, is instructive. It shows that
the Court is open to considering—and maybe even rejecting—what we see
now as immutable purposes of punishment. Here a passing comment by
Justice Marshall in the Furman case may be instructive. Justice Marshall, in
his concurring opinion, writes of several purposes of punishment that might
be at play in considering the death penalty. In addition to the familiar
170
purposes, he also lists “eugenics” as one of them. What is interesting is not
that Justice Marshall finds that eugenics is not a good justification for the
death penalty (indeed, he is skeptical that states even have procedures in
place that suggest that they believe in the eugenics justification). After all,
Justice Marshall is persuaded that nothing could justify the death penalty.
What is interesting is that Justice Marshall spends any time considering the
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Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
See Leo Zaibert, Of Normal Human Sympathies and Clear Consciences: Comments on Hyman
Gross’s Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 91, 95
(2016) (distinguishing between retributivist and utilitarian approaches by noting that
retribution ends “the very moment deserved punishment is inflicted” while that is not the
end of the story for utilitarian approaches).
See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“We are left [having
eliminated incapacitation and deterrence as sufficient justification], then, with
retribution as the primary rationale for imposing the death penalty.”).
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2769 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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eugenics justification at all. He ends up spending a couple of paragraphs
171
and a footnote on it.
It seems clear, by contrast, that if such a defense of the death penalty
were offered today—that is, a state said that it wanted to execute someone
for the reason that we need to kill them in order to prevent them from
reproducing—the Court would not discuss it in a few paragraphs and then
dismiss it. Rather, it would reject such a purpose of punishment as wholly
beyond the pale. It would not say that it was not a good justification. It
would say it doesn’t rise to the level of a legitimate reason to execute someone.
And indeed, for that reason, no one would bring eugenics to the Court as a
reason (and no one has). Justice Marshall’s treatment of the eugenics
justification is revealing, even if it was only there for reasons of
comprehensiveness. Its very treatment shows that at least some people
thought it might be a justification. It is doubtful that there is anyone who
believes so today. That is, we have at least one example of a purpose of
punishment that could be rejected, not because a punishment failed to
fulfill that purpose, but because the very purpose itself was not legitimate, and so
172
executing someone for that reason would be itself “cruel and unusual.”
Could something similar be said of retribution?

B. Retribution as Establishment
I should make clear at the outset what my goal in this section and the
next is: to ask whether retribution, in the form we have developed it in
considering the various kinds of Lackey claims, is a legitimate state purpose.
I am going to proceed by making an analogy between retribution in this
form and other kinds of disfavored—that is to say, illegitimate—state
purposes. Those two illegitimate kinds of purpose are 1) when the
government promotes some religious aim, so that it violates the prohibition
173
on the state establishing a religion and 2) when the government advances
an end based on nothing, ultimately, except passion, or caprice, or whimsy,
so that that state action becomes without a real rational basis whatsoever,
174
and seems to be based only on “animus.” I am not saying that retribution
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Id. at 355–57, 357 n.130. For a longer historical discussion of the eugenics argument, see
Carol S. Steiker, Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous Debate,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 655 (2010).
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Third, a penalty may be cruel and
unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose.”).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (creating the three-part test to distinguish
when a state purpose is legitimate in the context of the Establishment Clause).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment
which is “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects . . . lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests”).
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is in fact an establishment of religion, or that it might violate the prohibition
under the Fourteenth Amendment that government actions always have
175
some “rational basis.” I am only saying that retribution as a state purpose
looks an awful lot like these two types of illegitimate purposes, to the extent
that we may wonder whether retribution itself is a purpose that the state
cannot pursue. So I should not be taken to be saying, for example, that
retribution as a purpose can be challenged under the Establishment Clause
176
or under the Equal Protection Clause.
My point is only that retribution
tends to look like an illegitimate state purpose to the extent it resembles
177
these other, clearly illegitimate state purposes.
I am also not taking another tack against retribution. The Justices who
questioned retribution as a purpose of punishment tended to think that it,
like perhaps the death penalty itself, was not consistent with the “dignity of
human beings,” and that our “evolving standards of decency” had surely
178
evolved to the point where we could recognize this fact.
As much as I
would like to think that this is so, I am not sure. Insofar as evolving
standards of decency reflect, in essence, a societal consensus, it seems
obvious that our current consensus supports the death penalty, from which it
seems plausible to infer that there is support for the overall retributive aim of
179
that penalty.
The backlash that greeted Furman seems testament to that
fact. Many believe that criminals deserve to be punished, and that the death
175

176

177

178

179

Id.; but see id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But I had thought that one could consider
certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals—and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct.”).
Although I note in passing that the imposition of the death penalty has been challenged
at least once as an establishment of religion, to no avail. See Holberg v. State, 38 S.W.3d
137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“The primary effect of the [death penalty] statutes is
penal in nature, not religious, and the mere fact that the statutes are consistent with the
tenets of a particular faith does not render the statutes in violation of the Establishment
Clause.”); see also State v. James, 512 P.2d 1031, 1035–36 (Utah 1973) (noting that capital
punishment is prescribed punishment in the Christian Bible). It is certainly possible, as
well, that jurors may bring their faith into believing that the death penalty is a fitting
punishment.
The argument, then, is not that retribution as a state purpose violates the Establishment
Clause, or that it fails rational basis scrutiny. The point is that retribution looks a lot like
illegitimate state purposes in other areas of the law, which may make us more confident
that, under the Eighth Amendment, retribution should not be considered a permissible aim
for the state to pursue.
See, e.g., Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
403, 407–08 (2011) (relying on Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), to argue that an
evolving-standards-of-decency Eighth Amendment challenge must find that society has
matured to the extent that it finds the punishment to be inconsistent with human
dignity).
See Andrew Dugan, Solid Majority Continue to Support Death Penalty, GALLUP (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/186218/solid-majority-continue-support-deathpenalty.aspx. Recent data suggests that this support may be waning, even though it
remains the case that more Americans support the death penalty than oppose it.
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penalty is sometimes something that people deserve. The recent polling
done in the wake of the Tsarnaev bombings shows that support for the death
180
To the extent that evolving
penalty, while waning, is still rather robust.
standards of decency represents a normative judgment about whether killing
people is consistent with treating them with dignity—I think (and have said)
that this seems to be a contested matter. Kant thought that giving people
181
death respects their dignity because that is what they deserve. To not punish
them, when this is something they deserve, would be to treat them more as
things that could not be responsible for their actions, as something less than
human. Questions of dignity are difficult, complicated questions of morality
and theology. I do not think we could say, conclusively, that one side or the
other of the death penalty debate is categorically correct about what is or is
not consistent with human dignity.
But it is on precisely this point that I want to draw the analogy between
the government promoting retribution as a purpose of punishment and the
government establishing a religious viewpoint. Ronald Dworkin, in his book
on abortion, suggests that debates over abortion really reflect deeper
182
debates about the worth and value of human life.
When we argue about
abortion, underneath it is really a kind of religious debate about what life is
for, and when it becomes valuable. Such questions touch on matters of the
intrinsic worth of humans—their dignity, etc.—which Dworkin puts in the
category of the theological.183 Even though the participants in these debates
may not cast their positions in explicitly religious terms, it still is the case
that what they are debating—what they are arguing about—has overtones of
184
a religious debate.
Dworkin puts the debate in the terms of the
“sacredness” of human life: is human life, even from the very beginning, so
185
sacred that abortion should always be prohibited?
Dworkin says that for
the state to decide this debate in one way, viz., to say that the intrinsic value
of human life means that abortion is never permissible, would be akin to the
186
state supporting a particular religion.
Per the Establishment Clause, the
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Evan Allen, Few Favor Death for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Poll Finds, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 26,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/04/26/globe-poll-shows-diminishingsupport-for-death-penalty-for-tsarnaev/S3GMhFlGj5VUkZrmLzh1iN/story.html; Jennifer
Agiesta, Poll: 53% Say Boston Bomber Should Face Death Penalty, CNN: Politics (Apr. 21,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/21/politics/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-boston-bombingdeath-penalty-poll/.
Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the Death Penalty, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
595, 611 (2013).
DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 156–57.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 68–71.
Id. at 99–101.
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government cannot demand conformity on a religious question—and put
the force of the state in support of one religious viewpoint over another.
Dworkin’s argument about the “religious” nature of the abortion debate
187
People on
has obvious resonance with debates about the death penalty.
both sides of the debate put their positions in terms of respect for life and its
sacredness. Those who oppose the death penalty insist that respect for the
sanctity of life means that the state should never kill. Those who favor the
death penalty may say, to the contrary, that respect for the value of life above
all means that those who kill must face the ultimate sanction, e.g., death—
and also make a distinction between those who are innocent and those who
by their guilt have shown they deserve to die.188 So the death penalty in
many ways has characteristics of a religious debate. But my concern here is
to show also that retribution in many ways has these characteristics as well.
The value of retribution is not something that can be cashed out in what
we might call (following Dworkin again) secular values of public safety or of
crime reduction; more generally, retribution stands in contrast to debates
over the deterrence value of the death penalty. People who favor
retribution of the intrinsic desert variety will say that there is an intrinsic
value to executing someone: he is getting his just deserts; society is
promoting justice overall and avoiding its complicity in the injustice of not
189
punishing the deserving. Kant is yet again our standard bearer. Even if an
island society were to dissolve the next day, they must still execute the last
murderer. This is a value that could only be called intrinsic: there is nothing
that the society “gets” from executing the murderer except the value of
justice. We would be killing the person for the sake of nothing but justice.
Such a value transcends the ordinary, instrumental values that are the usual
stuff of government policy. In this, the debate over retribution is also a kind
of religious debate, because the value at stake is kind of like a religious
value—it has to do with things “higher” than preventing crime, or protecting
the public. It has to do with a higher sort of justice. And so too (to bring this
into the death penalty context) is the debate about whether this kind of
justice when it demands death really is consistent with treating people with
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Id. at 47, 113, 125, 153.
MICHAEL JOHN KRONENWETTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 41 (2d
ed. 2001) (“Those who oppose the death penalty insist that respect for the sanctity of life
means that the state should never kill. Those who favor the death penalty may say, to the
contrary, that respect for the value of life above all means that those who kill must face
the ultimate sanction, e.g., death—and also make a distinction between those who are innocent and those who by their guilt have shown they deserve to die.”).
Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15, 16 (1993) (arguing that the
state is obligated and not merely permitted to mete out retributivist punishment).
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dignity, or whether it is, in a way, fundamentally undignified—“the total
190
denial of the wrong-doer’s dignity and worth,” as Justice Marshall puts it.
The scenario with which I ended Part II puts this debate clearly into
focus: it is the Lackey analogue of Kant’s island. A person is on his deathbed,
moments away from dying—and we learn that his appeals have been
exhausted. Should society execute him? What would be the point? Those who
believe in intrinsic desert retribution will say that justice demands that the
person be executed, regardless of how close he is to death. Again, there may
be no secular purpose served by his execution, but that is not the point—the
point is retribution, the point is justice! It is a mistake to see some other
value that is supposed to be served. And I want to say here that this
retributive value, when we see it in this context, really is akin to a sort of
191
religious value. It is a value of transcendental, intrinsic importance.
A
state that promotes this value, that sees this value as being realized even in
an execution in the face of someone’s imminent death, is pushing a
religious point of view, or at least something very close to it.
Dworkin’s position can be put against the background of a larger
192
philosophical theory.
On that theory, the government should not
promote a particular religious point of view or, even more generally,
metaphysical views about which people may generally disagree. I want to
193
suggest that retribution is precisely a value of this sort —people who insist
that retribution is a value that the state ought to promote are insisting on a
value over which reasonable people can and do disagree. Compare this to
punishment for the sake of public safety, or crime control. These values—
secular values, using Dworkin’s framework—are values that most people can
agree upon, and see punishment as reasonably related to. It is not obvious
that retribution is like this—certainly not to the extent that retribution
would need to be insisted upon even up to the execution of a person already
dying. There, we see retribution as the only value at play, not mixed in with
other values such as deterrence or incapacitation—the person is
incapacitated, the deterrence value of killing him rather than letting him die
would be nil. It is not that retribution in a circumstance like that would be
pointless. For those who believe in intrinsic desert retribution, it is not
pointless—indeed justice demands it. It is that pursuing retribution in this
case would be to pursue a goal the state should not be able permissibly to
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Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See DWORKIN, supra note 27.
Here I build on my earlier work on Rawls’s theory of “public reason.” Chad Flanders, The
Mutability of Public Reason, 25 RATIO JURIS 180 (2012).
See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 64 (Conn. 2015) (“[T]he retributive value of an
execution defies easy definition and quantification, shrouded as retribution is in
metaphysical notions of moral restoration and just deserts.”).
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pursue. But in the end it does suggest a sort of modified Lackey claim. Such
an execution would be cruel and unusual, not because the execution would
serve no purpose, but that it would serve no purpose that governments can
legitimately pursue in punishing someone. Retribution might be satisfied in
executing the person on his deathbed, but this kind of retribution is
194
something that is not the government’s business.

C. Retribution as Animus
It may seem odd to claim that retribution as a purpose of punishment
may both be in service of some transcendental value and also be the result of
passion and caprice. But retribution may seem—and has seemed this way to
many people—to traffic in both of these possibilities. At a minimum, state
action has at least to be based in some reason; it has to be rational, to fulfill
195
some public purpose.
State action cannot be based simply in someone’s
passion, or desire to see some result done. It may be the case that
retribution as a goal is cover just for people’s passions—their desire for
revenge, for instance. And many have collapsed retribution and revenge in
196
precisely this way. When you take away any public purpose—any desire for
deterrence or for public safety—you are left simply with the bare desire to
avenge the wrong, the bare desire to “get back” at the person who has harmed
you. This may make sense as an individual matter, but it may be illegitimate
when it comes to a state purpose. What is the state’s interest in allowing
people to vent their passions in this way, by causing harm to another just for
the sake of revenge? Note that at least the community outrage version of
retribution based its need for punishment on the fear that, if not satisfied,
the anger of the community would break out in vigilante justice. That is a
public purpose: the desire to prevent individuals from taking the law into
their hands, and making punishment a matter of personal vendetta. As
Justice Marshall observed in his dissent to Gregg, this ground of punishment
can sound even utilitarian: we must punish so that we prevent society from
197
dissolving into chaos, with people seeking to carry out justice on their own.
We need to restrain them, so we punish, sometimes even executing people.
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I take this phrase from Anthony Duff. For a discussion of Duff’s theory, see Flanders,
supra note 150, at 53–56.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (identifying pure animus as an illegitimate
state interest).
At least one scholar has done so explicitly and unapologetically, defending revenge as a
valid way of doing justice. THANE ROSENBAUM, PAYBACK: THE CASE FOR REVENGE 281
(2013); Thane Rosenbaum, Eye for an Eye: The Case for Revenge, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/The-Case-for-Revenge/138155/.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 237–38 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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If we take the Part II scenario again, and look at it in terms of revenge
rather than in terms of intrinsic desert, we also see similarities. A person is
at his deathbed, and we insist on the need to execute him. There is again
no purpose served here in terms of deterrence, or in terms of public safety.
Perhaps there is a need to satisfy community outrage, but it must be quite
small: the person is about to die anyway, and it seems plausible that at this
point, the main people interested will be those who are personally invested in
198
seeing the person die rather than the community at large. What explains
why we must do the executing, rather than just letting nature take its
course—to let the person die on his own and without the help of the state?
We might even say that the retributive interest here is so slight, the
difference between dying in a state institution and being executed by that
state institution, that the only possible remaining explanation of the desire
to kill the person has to be not based on a reason, but based on just the bare
199
desire to be the instrument of this person’s death.
Motives that are based in
nothing but passion—and not in any overarching state purpose—are
sometimes called arbitrary, but this is just shorthand for saying that what is
motivating state action is really just animus, pure and simple. There is
nothing we could point to and say: “Yes, this is the reason we have to do this.”
Isn’t the execution of a dying man more a matter of spite than anything
else? “No, you can’t cheat your punishment,” we can imagine the
executioner saying, “even at this late date. It is up to us whether you live or
die; it is not up to you or to God. That’s what your punishment means—and
the present circumstances don’t change that.” This, if anything, looks a lot
200
like the “gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Or, to put it in the language of
animus, the only thing grounding the law is “a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,” something which “cannot constitute a
201
legitimate governmental interest.”
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Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2769 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“By then the
community is a different group of people. The offenders and the victims’ families have
grown far older. Feelings of outrage may have subsided. The offender may have found
himself a changed human being. And sometimes repentance and even forgiveness can
restore meaning to lives once ruined. At the same time, the community and victims’
families will know that, even without a further death, the offender will serve decades in
prison under a sentence of life without parole.”).
Flanders, supra note 120, at 380–81.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (“[T]he sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological
justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”).
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Again, my claim here is just by
way of analogy. No suit has been successful in claiming that prisoners or death row
inmates are a constitutionally protected group. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding prisoners are not a protected class). For a broad discussion of
the idea of “animus” with which I am in substantial agreement, see Susannah W. Pollvogt,
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
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There has been a more or less ongoing debate over whether retribution
as such is just a matter of revenge. Robert Nozick famously made a point of
202
Nozick said,
distinguishing how retribution was different than revenge.
inter alia, that retribution was a matter of justice, and not a personal
203
vendetta; that retribution focused only on the wrong and not the person;
that retribution wanted just to punish the person who did the wrong, and
revenge did not so limit itself.204 All of these points of contrast are welltaken. But it does not seem to follow that a state punishment could never in
fact be a vehicle of a person’s revenge. Maybe all of the usual features of
retribution are there, but only in sort of a formal way, so that the only real
remaining driving purpose to the punishment is to satisfy someone’s desire
for revenge. What substantively is driving the punishment is revenge—even
though the punishment does look to be retributive in all of the ways Nozick
identifies, e.g., it is done by the state against the person for his wrong and is
205
limited only to the punishment of the person who has done the wrong.
And isn’t this close to what we have in the case of killing the dying man?
What is left of the usual retributive function of punishment? He is about to
die anyway, and that seems close enough. Add to this the fact of delay, and
the likely subsequent reduction in the community’s interest in seeing justice
206
done, and you have the form of retribution but the substance of revenge.
Nozick’s typology may fit as a broad matter and may fit most cases where
retribution is presented as a justification for punishment; but it does not
seem to adequately capture cases like this one. Of course, it does not follow
that such a punishment has to be one that is motivated by revenge. Again, I
have just presented an argument for retribution that casts it in terms of a
transcendent value, the value of giving a person what he deserves. It is
possible that this really is what the state wants. But it is interesting that we can
also give an explanation that the state in this case is just pursuing revenge, and
207
that the punishment here is not motivated by reason but by passion.
Once more then, we can run a Lackey claim along these lines—but one
slightly different than the one canvassed at the end of Part I and developed a
202
203
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ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366–70 (1981). See also Flanders &
Markel, supra note 143, at 941–43.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333–34 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“It was
during the reign of Henry II . . . that English law first recognized that crime was more
than a personal affair between the victim and the perpetrator.”).
NOZICK, supra note 202, at 366–68.
Id. at 367–68, 370–71.
See Flanders, supra note 102, at 127–29.
Judge Fletcher, in his Ceja dissent, distinguished between community outrage and “blood
vengeance.” Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting). I think in this type of scenario, we clearly have a case of “blood vengeance,”
which (on Judge Fletcher’s reading) the Supreme Court has “definitively” stated “is not a
legitimate basis for the imposition of the death penalty.” Id.
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little further in Part II. It is not that retribution as a goal is no longer
fulfilled by the execution; it is, rather, at some point, retribution is no longer
a suitable state purpose in punishing someone. We have gone from saying
that the execution would be pointless because it would no longer fulfill
retribution to saying that the execution would be cruel and unusual because
no permissible state punishment could be fulfilled. This is similar to the original
Lackey claim, but more radical. It goes to attacking a purpose of punishment
as legitimate, rather than conceding the purpose is legitimate but not
208
realized by the execution. To be sure, this is a harder argument to make.
Retribution has long been held to be a legitimate purpose of punishment,
although support for it on the Supreme Court has waxed and waned at least
209
when it comes to the death penalty.
And I have certainly not done the
work to show that retribution in all of its instances is only either an
impermissible sort of “establishment of religion” or otherwise just motivated
210
by pure passion and so having no “rational basis.” That would be a strong
claim, and probably false. But it may be enough to show that, at some point in
the state’s planned execution of a prisoner, the purpose of retribution
begins to change its cast. It comes to look less like an ordinary goal of
punishment and more like a kind a religious mission or personal vendetta. I
merely assert that conclusion here, but I hope to have said enough to show
why I think that suggestion is, to me, persuasive.

CONCLUSION
This Article started with consideration of a very specific type of claim,
viz., the idea that a certain punishment—death—might be cruel and
unusual because, after a certain amount of delay, that punishment would be
pointless. In particular, I considered and developed in Part I the idea that
putting a person to death after substantial delay would no longer have a
point given certain theories of retributive punishment. On one theory, this
kind of Lackey claim would work. If retributive punishment were merely a
matter of community outrage, then it was plausible (although not
necessarily always true) that community outrage would fade over time, and
the community might come to forgive the person who committed such an
awful crime—or at least grow indifferent to him. If that happened, then it
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Thus the objection is not that blood vengeance (e.g.) is not a penological goal, but that it
is not a legitimate one. As Fletcher puts it, “The death penalty can be justified, when it can
be justified, only to the extent that it is necessary to serve vital and legitimate penological
goals. I believe it to be firmly established that a bare desire to exact blood vengeance
from the perpetrator of a crime, harbored and nursed along over the course of years and
decades, cannot satisfy that requirement.” Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 169–74.
E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995) (“[A] law must bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental purpose . . . .”).
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would indeed be pointless to punish the person with death. Why go on with
it? The community has gotten over its outrage. To kill the person on death
row would be needlessly cruel, because it would be pointless. So on one
version of retributivism, the Lackey claim had a good chance of succeeding.
However, community outrage was not, I argued, a good way to
understand retribution. A better theory (one which I think captures better
what most people think of as retribution and is also the most philosophically
defensible) would be one that saw punishing people as a matter of giving
them what they deserved. If we adopted this theory of retribution, a Lackey
claim becomes much harder to make. Although it might be better to kill the
person sooner rather than later, it is not obvious that there is some point
where the person would no longer “deserve” to die. If his crime demanded
a punishment of death, then he should get death—whether it is today,
tomorrow, or ten years down the road. Moreover, on intrinsic desert
retributivism, at least as I understand it, no amount of other types of
suffering can make up for the fact that the person deserves to die. Unless he
is given the death penalty, we have a kind of injustice. He is not being given
what he deserves—and so he should be given the death penalty even if he is
on his deathbed, moments away from death. After all, his punishment was
to be executed by the state, not just to die while being imprisoned by the
state.
It is after reaching this peculiar result at the end of Part II that my Article
took on a much broader target: the theory of retribution itself, and
especially as a theory of what the state might permissibly do. What would it
mean for a theory to require as a matter of justice that someone on his or
her deathbed be killed? Such a theory seemed to me to be of one of two
varieties, neither entirely suitable for a government to adopt. First, the
theory could be a sort of religious one, which saw the intrinsic value of
giving people what they deserved, even if this had no practical, earthly
benefit. The second saw the need to kill someone even as that person was
dying as a kind of revenge—the need to have the last word, even if no
purpose were served by the person being killed seconds before he was going
to die anyway. I then proposed that neither of these purposes might be
legitimate for the state to have. The first represented a sort of establishment
of religion by the state—promoting one intrinsic value that some people
might disagree was a value. The second ran the risk of grounding state
policy just on bare “animus” alone: the desire to see someone killed by us
rather than just dead. Of course, both these interpretations of retribution
(and the rejection of them as legitimate state goals) might be seen as just
begging the question against retribution. The whole idea of an intrinsic
value is that it does not depend on contingent goods being realized—they
211
If this is so, then my Article may be seen as
are ends in themselves.
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See David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment,
16 L. & PHIL. 507 (1997) (refuting the validity of a “consequentialist version of
retributivism”).
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suggesting the more modest point that at least some intrinsic values are not
proper, that is to say, legitimate state goals because they look too much like
things that are not legitimate state goals, viz., establishment of religion and
animus.
Could my overall argument be used to ground a Lackey claim? I offered
as much at the end of Part III, but it may pay to reiterate that claim here,
and extend it. If a person is dying, and the state insists on executing him, I
think that the desire to punish for the sake of retribution would then be
cruel and unusual—not because the execution would not fulfill some
retributive purpose (it might) but because retribution in that context would
be an illegitimate state purpose. This may seem a very circumscribed claim,
if it means only asserting a Lackey claim for clients who are on death’s row
and also on death’s door. But I could see the claim being presented in the
following way: if life in prison really is secure, and there is no risk of the
prisoner escaping, and therefore we have a certainty that the person will in
fact die in prison, then the further drive to not let the person simply die in
prison but the need to kill him before he dies seems to traffic in the same
sort of illegitimate desire for retribution. Whether this means that,
ultimately, retribution is never a legitimate purpose the state can have in
212
punishing, I leave for another day. But I do want to close by noting that it
was not always obvious to some members of the Supreme Court that
retribution could be a proper purpose of punishment—and it is not out of
the question that it may again seem that way to the Court sometime in the
future.
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See Flanders, supra note 150; Flanders, supra note 102.

